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About this report
As part of the wider debate on intangibles, this report looks 
at the extent to which companies using IFRS recognise 
development costs as assets in different countries and in 
different sectors. It investigates the factors that may lie 
behind that asset recognition and makes some suggestions 
as to how reporting of R&D might be improved.
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BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES
There are concerns that financial 
statements no longer reflect the 
underpinning drivers of value in modern 
business (Bernanke 2011; Haskel and 
Westlake 2017; Lev and Gu 2016).  
Such concerns are particularly relevant  
to accounting for intangibles, including 
research and development costs 
(hereafter R&D). Under IAS 38 Intangible 
Assets, while research costs are 
expensed, development costs should be 
capitalised, if they meet the six conditions 
specified in the standard. Thus, at least 
technically, the capitalisation of 
development costs is not considered a 
managerial choice. Nevertheless, from 
the financial statements’ preparers’ point 
of view, significant managerial judgement 
and detailed evaluations are required so 
as to conclude whether the six conditions 
have been met or not. Similarly, auditors 
need to exercise judgement with 
associated detailed evaluations to enable 
them to conclude that they are satisfied 
with the adopted accounting treatment  
of their clients. Interestingly, mandatory 
disclosure requirements in IAS 38 are only 
that the relevant amounts involved (ie 
capitalised and/or expensed and if these 
are material) be disclosed separately. 
Executive 
summary
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Thus, financial statement users, when 
using an annual report, primarily rely on 
firms’ voluntary/narrative R&D disclosure 
decisions for understanding the value  
and future benefits arising from such 
capitalised expenditure. In practice,  
given the requirements in IAS 1 
Presentation of Financial Statements,  
one would also expect companies to 
disclose information on significant risk 
factors and managerial judgement 
relative to material levels of capitalisation.
While there is literature relevant to R&D 
in non-IFRS (International Financial 
Reporting Standards) reporting regimes, 
to the best of the authors’ knowledge, 
research on the characteristics of firms 
that capitalise and/or expense R&D 
expenditure specifically under IFRS is 
minimal. Similarly, research that captures 
the quantity of companies’ disclosures in 
relation to R&D under an IFRS reporting 
regime is also minimal. Finally, users’ and/
or preparers’ views on the matter are 
largely absent from extant literature 
following the adoption of IFRS. The 
overall objective of this research is to 
shed light on these three areas. 
METHOD
This research project was conducted  
in three Phases
In Phase 1, by drawing on listed 
companies from more than 20 countries 
(20,475 firm-year observations) that 
adopted IFRS in 2005 or later, for the 
10-year period 2006 to 2015, we collect 
and summarise evidence on: how many 
firms expense all their R&D costs 
(expensers) and how many companies 
capitalise some of or all their R&D costs 
(capitalisers) and how many expense all 
their R&D costs. This evidence is provided 
in aggregate and also on a country and 
industry level. We also provide 
descriptive statistics of the amounts 
capitalised and expensed relative to 
market values. We then provide analyses 
that indicate the country- and firm-level 
determinants that drive the decision to 
capitalise development costs, as well as 
the amounts capitalised. 
In Phase 2, we capture and analyse the 
quantity of R&D-related disclosures in 
company annual reports for a sub-sample 
of around 3,400 observations from those 
firms identified in Phase 1. We construct a 
research instrument that contains 116 
R&D-related keywords. Using software, 
The capitalisation debate: R&D expenditure, disclosure content and quantity, and stakeholder views    |    Executive summary
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anti-self-dealing index, the higher the 
incidence and level of R&D capitalisation. 
Capitalisation is also greater and more 
likely to occur in countries with a common 
law legal system. 
Further analysis, examining expected 
levels of capitalisation, indicates that a 
large proportion of firm-year observations 
expensing R&D (84%) follow the expected 
method for the accounting treatment, 
given their firm- and country-specific 
characteristics. Nonetheless, we find that a 
large proportion of firm-year observations 
capitalising R&D (45%) would be expected 
to have expensed R&D costs, on the basis 
of their firm and country characteristics. 
This indicates that expensing should incur 
more frequently, given firm- and country-
specific characteristics. 
Thus, concerns that financial reporting is 
becoming less decision-useful – with 
balance sheets not fully (or at all) reflecting 
the rise in intangible assets (compared 
with a historic tangible asset base) that 
now underpin business models and firm 
economic growth – appear apposite.   
Phase 2: Quantity of R&D-related 
keywords 
Overall, we find that companies do not 
provide a high quantity of R&D-related 
disclosure, despite the importance of 
intangible assets such as R&D. Although 
some evidence was found of extensive 
disclosure with a high of 287 keywords 
referred to across the annual report, the 
median frequency in annual reports is 
only 17 keywords. This mirrors the relative 
lack of capitalisation although it raises 
questions about the general disclosure in 
R&D investment, even where this is 
largely expensed. Further, companies 
tend to refer more to R&D in the first half 
of the annual report (ie voluntary 
disclosure narratives) than in the second 
half (ie the financial statements). 
Moreover, not surprisingly, we find some 
evidence that firms that capitalise R&D 
tend to refer marginally more frequently 
to R&D in the financial statements section 
of the annual report than firms that 
expense R&D. In the narrative section of 
the annual report, we find no differences 
in the quantity of R&D disclosures 
between those companies that expense 
R&D and those that capitalise R&D. 
we count the number of times these 
R&D-related keywords feature in the 
annual reports as a whole and within the 
narrative and financial statements 
sections separately. We analyse these 
results in relation to capitalisers and 
expensers, and according to R&D 
intensity. Further analyses draw on the 
industry- and country-level determinants 
of ‘higher’ versus ‘lower’ disclosers.
Preliminary evidence from Phases 1 and 2 
was presented to an ACCA roundtable 
discussion. Using these findings, prior 
literature and feedback from the 
roundtable, in Phase 3, we conducted 
interviews with key stakeholders 
(preparers, auditors and investors), to 
gain insights into the capitalisation 
treatment, related disclosure and its 
decision usefulness. The last of these 
considers the relevance of the accounting 
treatment of R&D to users of financial 
statements and whether there is a need 
for the decision usefulness of R&D 
reporting to be improved.
MAIN FINDINGS
Phase 1: R&D accounting treatment 
and reporting
The data shows that 62.2% of 
observations in the sample fully expense 
R&D costs, while the remainder are split 
between those that partially capitalise 
(27.5%) and those that fully capitalise 
(10.3%). Arguably, these findings suggest 
that in conforming to the requirements 
and conditions set out in IAS 38, the 
majority of companies either fully or 
partly expense R&D and hence the 
recognition of R&D as an intangible asset 
category may be viewed as low.  
Within the results, there are country- and 
industry-level differences in capitalisation. 
At a firm level, the decision and 
magnitude of capitalisation is positively 
affected by a firm’s R&D intensity, 
leverage, internationalisation (measured 
by its percentage of international sales), 
and earnings-management incentives. 
Larger firms exhibit a lower incidence of 
capitalisation and capitalise proportionally 
lesser amounts than smaller firms. The 
stronger the audit and enforcement 
mechanisms in a country and the greater 
investor protection and the higher its 
The stronger the  
audit and enforcement 
mechanisms in a 
country and the greater 
investor protection and 
the higher its anti-self-
dealing index, the higher 
the incidence and level 
of R&D capitalisation. 
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Further, while it is acknowledged that 
capitalisation of some development costs 
could act as a signal of the managerial 
view of the future generation of income 
from certain assets, investors seem to 
focus more on the overall spend on R&D 
and are less interested in its accounting 
treatment, consistent with the no-effects 
hypothesis. This is in part further justified 
by a concern that capitalisation may serve 
as an earnings-management tool. As a 
result, some investors either capitalise all 
R&D and then amortise it or make no 
adjustments to the split featuring in the 
accounts, when they prepare their 
valuation estimates.
As regards disclosure, there was general 
agreement that mandatory disclosure in 
IAS 38 is minimal and often boiler-plated 
disclosure on R&D expense and 
capitalisation. There is a desire for greater 
disclosure, which would underpin any 
capitalisation decision based on the six 
criteria. Further, such disclosure should 
directly link to those disclosures provided 
under IAS1 on material judgements 
relating to the capitalisation decision. 
Nevertheless, the perception is that such 
disclosure is currently limited, on the 
grounds that this would force companies 
to provide proprietary information. 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY 
RECOMMENDATIONS
The issue of intangible assets and R&D in 
particular has been on the agenda of 
standard setters and regulators for some 
time. For example, in 2015, as a response 
to the request for views on the Agenda 
Consultation of the International 
Accounting Standard Board (IASB), the 
European Securities and Markets 
Authorities (ESMA) agreed that there is 
need for a review of the guidance for 
intangible assets and R&D. Indeed, ESMA 
suggested that the topic be added to the 
IASB’s research agenda as a separate 
item (Maijoor 2015). More recently, in 
November 2017, the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB) reported that it 
was undertaking a project aiming to 
review, inter alia, the mandatory 
disclosures for intangibles (FASB 2018). In 
the UK, in 2018, the Financial Reporting 
Council (FRC) initiated a project to review 
As with the results in Phase 1, there are 
country- and industry-level differences  
in capitalisation. 
The quantity of R&D disclosure is 
positively affected by a firm’s R&D 
intensity, size, risk (as proxied by beta), 
international exposure and incentives to 
manipulate earnings. Further, older firms 
tend to disclose less about R&D. Finally, 
companies in countries with high levels of 
corruption and those companies in a 
country with common law legal systems 
tend to disclose more about their R&D. 
Phase 3: Stakeholders’ views
The views of the 16 stakeholders who 
participated in our interviews are 
summarised as follows. There is a general 
support for a principles-based accounting 
standard that requires capitalisation 
against a set of criteria. This is against the 
uniform expensing accounting treatment 
in the US. It is argued that principles-based 
capitalisation enhances comparability 
between companies in specific sectors 
and over time. Even so, it is accepted that 
current reporting practice appears to be 
dominated by prudence rather than 
faithful representation. Thus, expensing 
R&D costs is more readily justified than 
capitalising them. This is driven by three 
main factors: difficulty in meeting the six 
criteria outlined in IAS 38, concerns over 
future impairments of development costs 
capitalised, and constraints in the 
assurance of any capitalised costs.   
Concerns were also raised as to the 
apparent inconsistency between the 
accounting treatment of internally 
generated R&D compared to externally 
purchased R&D. Capitalisation of internally 
generated development costs is largely 
constrained by the requirement to meet 
the six conditions specified in IAS 38. 
However, as part of an acquisition, under 
IFRS 3 Business Combinations, many of 
these assets that are not recognised in 
the acquiree’s pre-combination financial 
statements would then be measured at 
fair value and recognised. Thus, for two 
otherwise identical firms, differing 
accounting treatment of R&D costs could 
result in internally generated costs being 
primarily expensed whereas externally 
acquired could be capitalised.   
There is a general 
support for a principles-
based accounting 
standard that requires 
capitalisation against  
a set of criteria. 
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any capitalised amounts. Perhaps 
professional accountancy bodies can 
assist in the improvement of companies’ 
practices indirectly. Providing more 
in-depth training on the area of R&D  
and the issues around it could assist in  
a change of culture from an emphasis  
on ‘prudence’ to ‘more faithful 
representation’. Additionally, preparers 
and auditors could be encouraged to 
support more disclosures to assist 
transparency and the associated decision-
usefulness of financial statements.
We find that references to R&D-related 
terms are, in general, minimal in company 
annual reports. Moreover, where 
disclosure is provided, it varies 
significantly in length and location in the 
annual report. The interviews with 
stakeholders confirm a demand for more 
disclosure, especially when development 
costs are capitalised. Thus, as a first step 
forward, companies are encouraged to 
provide clearer and greater levels of 
disclosure than that currently provided in 
relation to the amounts of R&D 
expenditure in their financial statements.  
As far as the standard setters are 
concerned, if disclosures continue not to 
be mandated in IAS 38, a better link 
between R&D-related information and 
those disclosures required in IAS 1 about 
estimation of risks and future prospects 
would be useful to users of financial 
information. Moreover, given the 
signalling importance of overall R&D 
spend rather than necessarily how it is 
accounted for, our respondents deem 
that enhanced disclosure about the 
overall amount of R&D spend is 
appropriate to aid the decision-
usefulness of financial statements (either 
in notes to the financial statements or the 
narratives section of the annual report). 
current requirements and practice for the 
business reporting of intangibles and 
subsequently develop practical proposals 
for their improvement in the future. 
Following along these lines, in the 
feedback statement of its research 
agenda consultation, the European 
Financial Reporting Advisory Group 
(EFRAG) is also proposing to work on this 
area in the near future. More specifically, 
it proposes research regarding better 
information on intangible assets (EFRAG, 
2018). On that basis, it is anticipated that 
the conclusions and recommendations 
arising from our research findings would 
inform these projects. 
The findings show that more than 60% of 
the companies in the sample do not 
capitalise any R&D. Additionally, a large 
proportion of the companies that 
capitalise some development costs would 
be expected not to do so, given their 
firm- and country-specific characteristics. 
Overall, however, while maintaining the 
principles-based approach that supports 
capitalisation, current criteria in IAS 38 
would seem largely to militate against 
capitalisation. This is in contrast to IFRS 3 
where externally purchased R&D can be 
capitalised on acquisition. Hence, the 
findings reflect an apparent tension or 
inconsistency between accounting 
standards and the treatment of R&D 
costs. In relation to IAS 38, relaxing the 
criteria for capitalisation by reducing their 
number could be the way forward. This 
may help improve the value-relevance of 
financial information by more fully 
matching revenues with costs in the 
income statement through capitalising 
and amortising expense on value-creating 
assets such as R&D. Further, a reduction or 
simplification of the capitalisation criteria 
could also result in giving companies less 
room for exercising earnings management 
and increasing auditors’ ability to assure 
Providing more in-depth 
training on the area 
of R&D and the issues 
around it could assist 
in a change of culture 
from an emphasis on 
‘prudence’ to ‘more 
faithful representation’.
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iii.  There should be a requirement to set 
out the key judgements or 
assumptions made in deciding on 
capitalising or expensing development 
costs. The focus could be on technical 
feasibility with the addition of a 
requirement to report the thresholds 
companies use to assess the technical 
feasibility of completing the potential 
asset. For example, in pharmaceutical 
firms, is this when they complete 
human trials, or reach human trials, or 
earlier? For other types of firm, is this 
at a particular testing stage? Such 
information would help to understand 
differences between entities and gives 
an insight into trigger points. This 
should be required for each class of 
development costs capitalised (see 
required disclosure (i) above).
iv.  Moreover, we find that the amount of 
R&D-related disclosure from 
companies in countries such as Italy, 
which explicitly requires companies to 
discuss R&D in the Management 
Discussion and Analysis section of 
annual reports, significantly exceeds 
the levels among companies in 
countries lacking such a requirement. 
Hence, the revised Management 
Commentary or revised corporate 
governance policies at the country 
level could require a specific section 
on R&D, where relevant. 
v.  Finally, we find significant differences 
in the decisions about capitalising 
development costs, amounts 
capitalised and the quantity of R&D-
related terms, between countries. Thus, 
any changes in related regulations/
standards that will be applicable to a 
variety of countries will be unlikely to 
resolve differences in reporting 
practices between countries. The role 
of local institutional characteristics thus 
needs to be taken into consideration 
when interpreting a company’s 
financial reporting practices.
If the IASB decides to introduce specific 
mandatory disclosures on R&D within IAS 
38, we would propose, given our findings, 
that requirements be made that could 
address the following. 
i.  Capitalised development costs that 
are reported within the reconciliation 
of movements of intangible assets 
could be reported between different 
categories (eg recognition of 
development costs related to new 
projects or additions/improvements to 
existing projects that result in 
additional amounts of capitalised 
development costs). 
ii.  The total R&D expense that is currently 
required to be reported separately 
should be disaggregated between 
pure research and costs in relation to 
projects that fail to meet one of the six 
criteria. In fact, it would be valuable for 
companies to disclose cumulative 
costs expensed for projects that reach 
the point at which the entity starts to 
capitalise costs. Such information 
would allow users of the financial 
statements to understand what the 
total expense to date has been on such 
projects. In other words, did companies 
spend a lot to get to that point? This 
would be particularly relevant for firms 
that tend to expense all or most of 
their R&D costs (eg Pharmaceuticals). 
Similarly, if a company abandons a 
project, it would be helpful for users to 
know the sunk costs recognised as 
research to that point. 
There should be a 
requirement to set out 
the key judgements 
or assumptions 
made in deciding on 
capitalising or expensing 
development costs.
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1. Introduction
Despite the continuous adoption of IFRS, or convergence of national accounting standards with 
IFRS across the world, there remain concerns and debates about the levels of accounting 
comparability between companies. 
Significant aspects of these concerns relate 
to the level of assets recognised in financial 
statements, and the accompanying 
disclosures as mandated by the 
standards. It is argued that this is in part 
because of the principles-based nature of 
IFRS which, through their application, 
allows for managerial discretion.  
Of particular relevance to this project, ‘…
intangible investments have become the 
main value creators for many companies 
and economic sectors. However, these 
investments are rarely recognized as 
assets by current accounting standards 
[owing to expensing]’ (Zéghal and 
Maaloul 2011: 262). Hence, the level of 
recognition and the accounting treatment 
of R&D as a potential component of a 
company’s intangible asset base (Lev 
2018a; 2018b) has become increasingly 
important. Indeed, Lev (2018a) considers 
the accounting to be insufficient and 
inconsistent with knowledge-based 
business models and the failure to 
recognise intangibles. 
financial statement users have to rely on 
firms’ voluntary/narrative R&D disclosure 
decisions for understanding the value and 
future benefits arising from such 
capitalised expenditure. But this, itself, is 
also subject to managerial bias in 
reporting (Lev 2018b).  
Given this background, this project 
focuses on the areas of accounting for, 
and the reporting of, R&D, and has the 
following aims and objectives.
1.1 AIMS
The aims of this research project are  
to examine:
•  companies’ reporting practices for 
capitalisation (ie capitalisation versus 
expensing) and the levels of 
capitalisation of development costs 
•  companies’ levels of disclosures on the 
area of R&D, and 
•  the views of key stakeholders on 
companies’ reporting practices for 
R&D accounting and reporting.
Under US accounting standards, all R&D 
expenditure is expensed as incurred and 
no capitalisation is permitted.1 Under IAS 
38 Intangible Assets, although research 
costs are expensed, development costs 
should be capitalised. Such capitalisation 
of development costs is dependent on 
their meeting six conditions specified in 
the standard. Thus, the capitalisation of 
development costs is not considered a 
managerial choice. Nevertheless, from 
the financial statements’ preparers’ point 
of view, significant managerial judgement 
and detailed evaluations are required to 
determine whether these conditions have 
been met or not. Similarly, auditors need 
to exercise judgement and carry out 
sufficiently detailed evaluations to 
determine whether they are satisfied with 
the adopted accounting treatment of their 
clients. Interestingly, mandatory disclosure 
requirements in IAS 38 are minimal in this 
respect, although IAS 1 does specify 
disclosure if such judgements are a 
source of estimation uncertainty in 
relation to a material item in the financial 
statements. In general, however, for R&D, 
1  The only exception to this, under US GAAP, relates to software development (SD) costs which can be capitalised once technological feasibility is established (SFAS 86 Accounting for the Costs of 
Computer Software to Be. Sold, Leased, or Otherwise Marketed).
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More specifically, focusing on a sub-
sample of firms identified in Phase 1, we 
count the number of R&D-related 
keywords/phrases in companies’ annual 
reports as a whole and across the 
narratives and financial statements 
sections, separately. Subsequently, this 
information is presented across countries 
and industries as well as between 
capitalisers and expensers. Further 
analyses draw on the firm- and country-
level determinants affecting a firm’s 
disclosure quantity.
Using the evidence gathered on the first 
two objectives, the third objective is to 
gain insights into the capitalisation 
treatment and related disclosure and 
their decision-usefulness, and this was 
done by conducting interviews with key 
stakeholders (preparers, auditors and 
investors). We also gauge stakeholders’ 
views on how R&D reporting could be 
improved. Ultimately, information from 
these interviews enables comment on 
stakeholder perceptions of the adequacy 
of the current reporting framework and 
recommendations for potential changes.
1.3 REPORT OUTLINE
The next chapter provides a brief 
overview of the prior academic literature.  
The research approach is then outlined in 
Chapter 3, followed by the presentation 
and discussion of the results of each 
Phase separately in Chapter 4.  
Conclusions are set out in Chapter 5.
1.2 OBJECTIVES
The above aims are broken down into 
three related objectives, which have been 
pursued in three distinct research Phases. 
The first objective is to analyse both the 
proportion of firms capitalising R&D 
(either fully or partially) compared to 
those expensing all R&D-related costs, 
and their levels of capitalisation. This 
analysis is based on a large sample of 
listed companies from more than 20 
countries, which adopted IFRS (or had 
their national accounting standards 
converged to IFRS) in 2005 or later, for  
the 10-year period 2006 to 2015.  
This evidence is provided at an aggregate 
level and at country and industry levels. 
This analysis is supplemented by 
descriptive statistics on the amounts 
capitalised and expensed relative to 
market values. Further analysis provides 
evidence on the country- as well as 
firm-level determinants that drive the 
decision to capitalise development costs 
as well as the amounts capitalised. 
Beyond this, econometric models are also 
run to identify over- and under-
capitalisation against expected levels at  
a firm level. This analysis is based on 
industry and year clusters, while 
controlling for country influences. 
The second objective is to capture and 
analyse the quantity of R&D-related 
disclosures in companies’ annual reports. 
The aims of this 
research are broken 
down into three related 
objectives, which have 
been pursued in three 
distinct research Phases.
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2. Literature review
The accounting for R&D, the relevant level of disclosure and its informational content to users 
remains a highly debated and researched area (see, for instance, the reviews in Jeny and 
Moldovan 2018; Wyatt 2008; Zéghal and Maaloul 2011). 
Given the increase in importance of 
intangible compared with tangible assets 
in driving company value, this is an 
important area to a multitude of 
stakeholders ranging from preparers to 
users and, more widely, to standard-
setting bodies globally. Indeed, Lev 
(2018a: 465) argues that the deterioration 
of the usefulness of financial information 
that has been reported in the US market 
(Lev and Gu 2016) is in part attributable to 
‘standard-setters’ failure to adjust asset 
recognition rules to the fundamental shift 
in corporate value-creating resources 
from tangible to intangible assets’. While 
recognising that Lev and Gu’s findings are 
based on a US study, the general 
argument that intangible assets, including 
R&D, are not reflected on financial 
statements, holds even under IFRS where 
capitalisation is permitted (Zéghal and 
Maaloul 2011). Hence, Lev’s assertion that 
there is ‘a widespread dissatisfaction with 
the relevance and usefulness of corporate 
financial report information to investors’ 
(Lev 2018a: 465) that reflects a ‘largely 
uninformative balance sheet’ (Lev 2018a: 
466) potentially extends beyond US 
accounting standards. 
This prior, primarily non-IFRS, literature 
identifies the capitalisation of R&D as a 
function of a firm’s life cycle and whether 
the firm meets the conditions for 
capitalisation. On this basis, the following 
characteristics have been found to affect 
a company’s decision about capitalising 
development costs as well as levels of 
development costs capitalised: book to 
market ratio, as a proxy of risk and 
growth; R&D value, which is a proxy for 
the success of a firm’s R&D expenditure; 
R&D intensity, on the rationale that the 
more R&D-intense a company is, the 
higher the probability that it will capitalise 
some development costs and the higher 
the amounts to be capitalised; the market 
value of the company, as a proxy for size; 
the company’s beta, as a proxy for risk 
because riskier firms are more likely to 
engage in basic research that is expensed 
than are less risky firms (Aboody and Lev 
1998); and finally leverage, as a proxy for 
financial health. 
In addition to these characteristics, the 
literature has concentrated on managerial 
incentives, which may be associated with 
the company’s reported performance, as 
the latter is affected by the accounting 
Against this backdrop, and in line with the 
project’s aims, this chapter summarises 
three key areas of the literature, which 
relate to: the determinants of the 
decision to capitalise development costs 
and levels of development costs 
capitalised; the signalling role of R&D 
capitalisation; and the views of preparers 
and auditors on the role of accounting 
conservatism and prudence. We discuss 
these three key areas in turn, while 
recognising that much of this prior 
literature is non-IFRS based. 
2.1 DETERMINANTS OF DECISION TO 
CAPITALISE DEVELOPMENT COSTS AS 
WELL AS LEVELS OF DEVELOPMENT 
COSTS CAPITALISED
For reporting regimes other than US 
GAAP that permit (or permitted in the 
past) capitalisation of development costs, 
prior literature has examined the 
company characteristics that are 
associated with a firm’s decision to 
capitalise some of the R&D expenditure 
(eg France: Cazavan-Jeny et al. 2011; 
Germany: Dinh et al. 2015; Italy: 
Markarian et al. 2008; UK: Oswald 2008; 
Oswald and Zarowin 2007). 
treatment of R&D. More specifically, 
companies may manage their earnings, 
via the amounts of R&D costs expensed/
capitalised, in an attempt to achieve 
certain earnings targets. Focusing upon 
French companies in the pre-IFRS period, 
when companies were permitted to 
capitalise research and development 
costs under certain conditions, Cazavan-
Jeny et al. (2011) contend that managers 
may capitalise research and development 
costs to meet or beat earnings 
thresholds/targets or to avoid reporting 
losses. In their Italian study, also based in 
the pre-IFRS period, Markarian et al. 
(2008) conclude that capitalisation may be 
motivated by earnings smoothing 
purposes. Finally, in their study on 
Germany, which covers companies 
reporting under IFRS, Dinh et al. (2015: 3) 
found that ‘pressure to beat past year’s 
earnings and analysts’ forecast of 
earnings increases the probability of a 
firm capitalising R&D in the current 
period. This evidence is in line with the 
notion of firms opportunistically 
managing earnings via R&D 
capitalisation’. They contend that both 
the decision to capitalise and how much 
to capitalise are strongly and positively 
associated with benchmark beating. 
2.2 R&D CAPITALISATION AND 
SIGNALLING
In line with the notion that an asset, in this 
case development costs capitalised in a 
given year, is expected to yield future 
economic benefits, a company’s decision 
to capitalise development costs can be 
perceived as a signalling mechanism of 
the future economic benefits associated 
with the asset. In contrast, the ‘no-effects 
hypothesis’ (see Watts and Zimmerman 
1986: 72–6) contends that the market can 
see through the earnings number and 
thus stock price changes are not 
associated with voluntary changes in 
accounting procedures unless they have 
any cash flow impacts. Thus, it can be 
argued that capitalisation of development 
costs could be considered as a signal only 
in the absence of incentives to 
manipulate earnings by employing this 
mechanism. On that basis, prior literature 
has indeed examined the relevance of 
such information to market participants 
and the evidence is mixed. 
For example, Ahmed and Falk (2006) 
conclude that capitalised R&D signals good 
news about future earnings flow, in contrast 
to the very conservative view of expensing 
all R&D. In their Australian study of 381 
firms over the period 1992–99, they find that 
‘R&D capitalized expenditure is positively 
and significantly associated with the firm’s 
future earnings’ (Ahmed and Falk 2006: 231). 
Further, Shah et al. (2013: 159), who examine 
listed companies in the UK, find ‘that 
capitalised R&D expenditure is positively 
and significantly related to the market value 
of the sample firms in the period 2001–
2011’ and infer ‘that investors perceive the 
capitalisation of R&D to be related to 
successful R&D projects’ (Shah et al. 2013: 
168). Similarly, in their post-IFRS UK study, 
Tsoligkas and Tsalavoutas (2011) show the 
value relevance of capitalised development 
costs. Consistent with these findings for the 
UK, Oswald et al. (2017: 20) conclude that, 
‘R&D capitalization has information value’. 
In sum, although these findings support 
the signalling approach, these studies lack 
analyses of the underlying company 
incentives for earnings management. 
In contrast, in support of the ‘no-effects 
hypothesis’, Goodacre and McGrath (1997) 
in an experimental study on R&D 
capitalisation found no significant difference 
of imputed market value between expenser 
and capitaliser and both were greater than 
for a fixed-asset purchaser. Hence, they 
assert that analysts are not concerned about 
the accounting treatment but are concerned 
that R&D is occurring.2 In fact, they also find 
that ‘analysts did not seem to be misled by 
the higher earnings reported for the 
company capitalising R&D expenditure...
and that company management’s pre-
occupation with short term earnings might 
be unnecessary’ (Goodacre and McGrath 
1997: 155). Consistent with this, Green et al. 
(1996) find that accounting treatment did 
not hinder the market in valuing R&D in the 
UK when capitalisation of development 
costs was a matter of choice. More recently, 
Dinh et al. (2015) find that capitalised 
development costs are value-relevant only 
for the sub-sample of firms not associated 
with earnings management incentives. Thus, 
they contend that the presence of earnings 
management counteracts the signalling 
value of capitalisation. Similar findings are 
reported by Kreß et al. (2019) who, inter alia, 
examine the value relevance of capitalised 
development costs in debt markets. 
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Companies may manage 
their earnings, via the 
amounts of R&D costs 
expensed/capitalised, 
in an attempt to achieve 
certain earnings targets.
2  In their recent survey of the literature, Jeny and Moldovan (2018) support these findings by arguing that it is the total R&D investment effort that has a real positive impact on firms’  
growth opportunities.
2.3 ACCOUNTING CONSERVATISM 
AND PRUDENCE: VIEWS OF 
PREPARERS AND AUDITORS
In an IFRS setting, it is commonly 
recognised that most costs are expensed 
owing to the requirement to meet (and 
assure) the six conditions set out in IAS 38 
(Siegel and Borgia 2007; Stark 2008; 
Zéghal and Maaloul 2011). This expensing 
treatment is especially prevalent in some 
sectors, such as pharmaceuticals, where 
any capitalisation will historically be only 
after regulatory approval, which is 
towards the very end of the overall R&D 
process. This may in part reflect the 
prudence principle that was enshrined 
within the Conceptual Framework until 
20103 and hence was an inherent feature 
of the standard when this was developed. 
The prevalence of expensing may also 
reflect the long history of accounting 
conservatism across jurisdictions prior to 
the implementation of IAS 38 (Billiot and 
Glandon 2005; Entwistle 1999; Lev et al. 
2005; Nixon 1997). For instance, with 
reference to the UK, Stark (2008: 277) 
states that ‘overall, the history of the 
development of UK standards for the 
recognition and disclosure of R&D 
expenditure suggests that there was no 
enormous demand for any treatment 
other than immediate expensing. 
Certainly, there was no demand for any 
widespread capitalisation of research 
expenditures’. Consistent with Stark 
(2008), a prudent or conservative 
approach in favour of expensing is noted 
by Ball et al. (1991), who found a general 
over-expensing due to prudence and fear 
of future uncertainty pertaining to write 
downs. Similarly, in his survey of senior UK 
accountants, Nixon (1997) found that 
most respondents preferred to expense 
all R&D costs for the ‘theoretically sound 
reason that the ex ante benefits are too 
uncertain’ (Nixon 1997: 265). Of the 
survey respondents, 81% confirmed a full 
expensing approach to R&D. This is 
salient because, under UK GAAP, 
companies had the choice over 
capitalisation if the conditions in the 
standard were met. Nixon (1997) found 
that preparers opposed capitalisation as 
they argued that it required subjective 
judgements and that it increased the 
scope for earnings manipulation. 
Moreover, they raised concerns about 
future impairments when faced with 
changing technologies.4 Consistent with 
the findings of Goodacre and McGrath 
(1997) and the no-effects hypothesis, Nixon 
(1997: 273) concludes that the ‘lack of a 
perceived relationship between the 
accounting treatment of R&D, in particular 
the immediate write-off policy of most UK 
companies, and economic consequences is 
consistent with the findings that analysts 
are not misled by the accounting treatment 
of R&D expenditures’. 
Entwistle (1999) carried out interviews with 
two groups: analysts and firm executives 
based in Canada, at a period when the R&D 
treatment there was similar to that in the 
UK. He found that most of the executives 
opposed capitalisation. Common reasons 
for this were to avoid having to manage 
future write-downs and that expensing as 
part of the overall R&D spend is viewed 
positively by the investment community, 
with the overall investment in R&D being  
of prime importance. Similarly, he found 
that the majority of analysts also opposed 
capitalisation. Reasons advanced included 
a preference for conservative accounting 
matched with an inability of firms to  
predict the future adequately and the 
possibility of large future impairments. 
Further, they expressed concerns over 
earnings manipulation and that expensing 
helps remind management that a cash 
outlay has been made.
From another perspective, Lev (2018b: 45) 
argues that ‘auditors are concerned with 
enhanced litigation risk’ arising from issues 
or errors in over-capitalisation. In contrast 
to the views of preparers, however, there 
are very few papers examining R&D cost 
capitalisation from an auditor perspective 
(Jeny and Moldovan, 2018). Tutticci et al. 
(2007), in their Australian study, found that 
that external monitoring by a Big Five 
auditor and the Australian Security 
Commission decreases managers’ tendency 
to capitalise R&D costs. Thus, there is less 
scope for earnings management type 
behaviour and more towards expensing, 
consistent with the general views of 
preparers in earlier studies. Further, they 
find that appointing a Big Five equivalent 
auditor also leads to a stronger relationship 
between capitalised R&D and stock returns. 
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In an IFRS setting, it is 
commonly recognised 
that most costs are 
expensed owing to the 
requirement to meet (and 
assure) the six conditions 
set out in IAS 38.
3 Prudence was removed from the Conceptual Framework in 2010 and re-instated to the Framework in 2018 (ACCA 2014; IFRS 2018a) for annual periods beginning on or after 2020.
4  The worry about impairment is consistent with that observed by Ciftci (2010: 434), who commented that ‘the errors in capitalization due to high uncertainty associated with future benefits might 
lead to subsequent write-offs in capitalized SDC [software development costs] and reduce future earnings’,  albeit in a US context.
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Owing to the need to assure capitalised 
assets and the appropriateness of the 
accounting treatment against the 
standard and the conditions, Cheng et al. 
(2016) find that the level of capitalisation 
is associated with an increase in the audit 
fee for IFRS reporters. This is also 
confirmed in the study by Kreß et al. 
(2019) and is attributed to increased levels 
of audit risk and the extra work required 
to verify how conditions have been met, 
which may require external experts, and 
to satisfy the auditor over managerial 
judgements behind the capitalisation. 
2.4 R&D-RELATED DISCLOSURES
Reflecting the general lack of 
capitalisation and asset recognition, 
Wyatt (2008: 218) asserts that intangibles 
are ‘at the center of an information gap 
that arises from the forward-looking and 
uncertain nature of economic activity’. 
Beyond meeting the six conditions and 
the then-mandatory capitalisation, IAS 38 
has no further disclosure requirement and 
thus does not counter this ‘information 
gap’. Hence, the disclosures provided by 
companies beyond the statutory 
accounting financial information are 
voluntary. Stark (2008: 277) comments, 
‘although the situation evolved to 
incorporate the mandatory disclosure of 
R&D expenditures, some concerns were 
expressed as to whether a single number 
was likely to be informative without 
further details of the particular projects 
being pursued and the likelihood of their 
success’. More bluntly, albeit in a US 
context, Lev (2018a; 481) asserts that 
‘there should be a considerable 
enhancement of the disclosure of 
investments in long-term, value-creating 
assets. Currently, there is an inexplicable 
“conspiracy of silence” concerning these 
investments’ (see also Srivastava, 2014). 
This leads to a great reliance on voluntary 
disclosure (Lev 2018b). 
Following this line of reasoning, there is 
within the literature a tension between 
those who are satisfied as to the 
adequacy of the present situation, which 
relies primarily on voluntary disclosures, 
and others asking for more recognition and 
far greater mandatory disclosure on 
intangible assets. Indeed, Merkley (2014: 
728) recognises R&D as an area of 
‘significant information problems between 
managers and investors’. Nonetheless, he 
argues that ‘narrative [voluntary] disclosure 
provides a channel for managers to convey 
contextual information about their firms to 
market participants. This type of disclosure 
can bridge the gap between a firm’s 
financial statement numbers and its 
underlying business fundamentals’ (and 
see Penman 2009; Skinner 2008). Further, 
such disclosure should ultimately benefit 
firms through higher equity valuations and 
lower costs of capital (and see Healy and 
Palepu 2001). This positive view is shared 
by Zéghal and Maaloul (2011: 262), who 
comment that their ‘[literature] survey 
concludes that disclosure is considered as 
a solution to the negative consequences of 
non-recognition of intangibles in financial 
statements’. Empirical literature, such as 
the study by Liang and Yao (2005), reports 
that, for intangibles, non-financial 
information has incremental explanatory 
power far beyond financial information in 
explaining a company’s value. 
A further major aspect of the disclosure 
debate is the extent of proprietary 
information. As capitalisation inherently 
links to forward-looking earnings streams, 
much of the relevant information is 
confidential and commercially sensitive to 
the business. Hence, Stark (2008: 277) 
notes ‘issues of confidentiality and 
associated likelihood of proprietary costs 
were raised with respect to disclosure’. In 
his study of executives, Entwistle (1999) 
finds mixed evidence, with slightly more 
than half his subjects expressing concern 
about proprietary information whereas the 
rest did not have concerns that confidential 
and sensitive information needed to be 
disclosed to give insights into intangibles. 
This reflects the theoretical literature 
(Verrecchia 1983) suggesting that, when 
making disclosure decisions, firms trade off 
the costs of revealing proprietary 
information with the resulting benefits, such 
as lower costs of capital, analyst following 
or more accurate equity valuations. 
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Beyond meeting the 
six conditions and 
the then-mandatory 
capitalisation, IAS 38 
has no further disclosure 
requirement. This 
arguably leads to an 
'information gap'.
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3. Research 
approach
3.1 PHASE 1 – SAMPLE SELECTION
The data selection starts by focusing on 
the countries that converged their 
national standards to IFRS or adopted 
IFRS on a mandatory or voluntary basis.5 
We obtained data from Worldscope/
Datastream and include all companies in 
the research lists of dead and active firms 
constructed by Datastream for each 
country we identify as suitable for our 
sample in the first step. To avoid double 
counting, firms that are cross-listed in 
more than one market are included in our 
sample once, depending only on the 
country of primary listing. In addition, we 
eliminate securities that are not classified 
as equity.6 Further, we eliminate all 
companies that do not report under IFRS 
or local GAAP for countries that 
converged their national standards to 
IFRS.7 We then retain in our sample all 
R&D active companies, ie we include only 
companies that report either an R&D asset 
or an R&D expense in the period between 
2006 and 2015. Subsequently, we eliminate 
1,510 firm-year observations belonging to 
the Oil and Gas industry because the 
database may classify the relevant 
extraction costs as development costs. We 
also exclude 433 firm-year observations 
with accounting periods of more than 380 
5  To assess whether a certain country has adopted (mandatorily or voluntary) or converged to IFRS, we rely on the guide published by the IFRS Foundation on the use of IFRS by jurisdiction (IFRS 2018b). 
6  To assess whether a stock is classified as equity, we rely on datatype TYPE and retain those stocks which are recorded as equity (ie EQ)
7 We rely on Worldscope item ‘accounting standards followed’ (WC07536) to identify the reporting standards that companies follow. 
8  We acknowledge that we eliminate a relatively large proportion of firm-year observations because of missing data. Whilst this is common in this type of research, in additional analysis we find that 
of the 156,741 firm-year observations we exclude, 43,180 firm-year observations have available data other than R&D. The majority of these observations are from Hong Kong (5,714), the UK 
(5,009), Australia (4,749), China (4,326), India (2,576) and France (2,206). Further, it is observations from these industries that are mainly excluded because of unavailable R&D related data: 
Financials (10,436), Industrials (9,150) and Consumer Services (7,068). Subsequently, we examined whether these firms capitalize software development costs. We find that only 14,249 firm-year 
observations report a software development cost on the balance sheet. Although these firms do not report an R&D expense (or asset), they capitalize software development costs and these are 
rather small relative to the market value or total assets of the firm (median values of 0.004 and 0.002 respectively). Overall, firm-year observations excluded represent firms with incomplete data in 
the database, no R&D expenditure or arguably immaterial R&D expenditure (since it is not recorded as a separate line item in the income statement).
TABLE 3.1: PHASE 1 – SAMPLE SELECTION
177,588 We focus on the countries that adopted or converged with IFRS between 2005 and 
2015. Our sample begins in 2006 and ends in 2015 and excludes companies that do 
not report under IFRS (or local standards that have converged with IFRS)
(156,741)
(138,286)
(1,510)
(433)
(16,205)
(307)
total firm-year observations excluded
excluding non-R&D active companies
firms from Oil & Gas industry
financial year-end changed
missing firm-specific data
missing country-specific data
20,847 Sample 
(372) Firm-year observations with negative book value of equity
20,475 Final sample [t = 2006, 2015] [6,125 firms]
12,746
7,729
2,103
5,626
reporting expensed R&D only (Expensers) 
reporting a capitalised amount of R&D (Capitalisers)
reporting capitalised R&D only (Full capitalisers)
reporting both capitalised and expensed R&D (Non-full capitalisers)
countries. We classify firm-year 
observations as a ‘capitaliser’ if a company 
capitalises, in full or partly, development 
costs during the year, otherwise we 
consider the company as an ‘expenser’.  
In total, we have 12,746 expensers and 
7,729 capitalisers, of which 2,103 
capitalise all of their R&D expenditure. 
Table 3.1 summarises the data selection 
process and shows the breakdown 
between capitalisers and expensers. 
or less than 350 days (similar to García Lara 
et al. (2005)). Further, we exclude 16,205 
firm-year observations with insufficient 
firm-level data.8 Finally, we exclude 307 
firm-year observations with missing 
country-specific data and 372 firm-year 
observations with negative book values. 
This process results in our sample of 
20,475 firm-year observations 
corresponding to 6,125 firms, across 37 
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TABLE 3.2: Phase 1 – Sample composition by country 
COUNTRY 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 TOTAL
Argentina 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Australia 81 92 106 118 139 129 126 112 122 89 1,114
Austria 21 24 23 25 24 25 26 23 20 20 231
Belgium 18 22 25 31 28 28 23 20 21 23 239
Brazil 0 0 0 0 23 19 36 25 30 40 173
Canada 0 0 0 0 0 29 67 80 82 77 335
Chile 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 7 7 12 33
China 0 18 18 51 67 106 340 426 1,272 1,406 3,704
Denmark 29 31 31 32 35 40 34 30 28 22 312
Finland 51 66 65 60 63 64 65 46 51 51 582
France 111 127 126 116 132 126 105 92 108 120 1,163
Germany 139 165 162 167 169 165 155 148 154 158 1,582
Greece 11 10 15 19 20 18 29 12 15 10 159
Hong Kong 83 93 105 101 106 127 156 154 172 179 1,276
India 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 319 214 188 721
Indonesia 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 16 14 14 58
Ireland 6 6 11 11 10 6 9 9 9 11 88
Israel 0 0 12 12 13 18 18 18 17 12 120
Italy 44 45 61 54 59 56 50 40 41 55 505
Japan 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 8 16 39 68
Jordan 1 2 1 1 2 3 3 3 2 6 24
Korea 0 0 0 0 0 202 358 564 550 507 2,181
Malaysia 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 48 45 100
Mexico 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 6 7 17
Netherlands 22 21 22 26 25 25 23 21 21 18 224
New Zealand 0 10 10 9 9 10 8 13 16 19 104
Norway 14 18 18 23 19 26 25 19 23 20 205
Peru 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 6 5 9 24
Philippines 1 1 6 7 6 8 5 0 0 0 34
Portugal 5 5 6 7 5 6 3 1 1 1 40
Singapore 5 5 10 10 6 6 9 10 9 2 72
South Africa 24 23 23 25 22 21 27 30 26 21 242
Spain 18 18 24 19 19 23 24 20 16 18 199
Sweden 64 74 76 74 73 82 90 79 79 89 780
Switzerland 62 71 72 71 72 70 66 62 60 60 666
Turkey 4 4 4 4 4 8 55 68 69 50 270
United Kingdom 203 264 326 323 339 330 288 261 257 238 2,829
TOTAL 1,017 1,215 1,358 1,396 1,490 1,780 2,252 2,749 3,581 3,637 20,475
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 provide information on the sample composition by country and industry respectively. The latter classification is 
based on the 10 industries specified by the Industry Classification Benchmark. These tables indicate that our sample consists of 
large proportion of Chinese firms (3,704 firm-year observations), UK firms (2,829 firm-year observations) and Korean firms (2,181 
firm-year observations). The weight of the remaining countries is much smaller on an individual basis, although collectively they are 
still represented by a relatively large number of observations. 
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TABLE 3.3: Phase 1 – Sample composition by industry
INDUSTRY   2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 TOTAL
Basic materials 102 122 146 157 172 204 275 384 525 514 2,601
Consumer goods 187 229 235 242 251 335 422 553 746 756 3,956
Consumer services 40 50 54 55 69 81 88 103 104 122 766
Financials 22 25 27 34 35 38 50 35 35 41 342
Health care  
(inc. Pharmaceuticals)
126 153 177 182 207 211 276 358 451 485 2,626
Industrials 302 346 399 419 431 537 689 824 1,149 1,145 6,241
Technology 203 252 280 263 277 318 385 433 498 488 3,397
Telecommunications 17 21 18 21 19 21 21 15 27 29 209
Utilities 18 17 22 23 29 35 46 44 46 57 337
TOTAL 1,017 1,215 1,358 1,396 1,490 1,780 2,252 2,749 3,581 3,637 20,475
Our sample also consists mainly of companies in the following industries: Industrials (6,241 firm-year observations), Consumer Goods 
(3,956 firm-year observations), Technology (3,397 firm-year observations), Basic Materials (2,601 firm-year observations) and Health 
Care (2,626 firm-year observations). The weight of the remaining industries is much smaller.
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3.2 PHASE 1 – METHODS APPLIED
The first aim of this Phase is to identify 
the factors that affect a firm’s decision to 
capitalise development costs, and the 
amounts capitalised. Multivariate analysis 
is used with the dependent variable 
being an indicator variable (CAP). This 
equals to 1, when a company capitalises 
(all or part of) R&D in a certain year and  
0 otherwise. This model examines 
relevant factors which may affect the 
decision to capitalise R&D. Further, the 
amount of R&D capitalised scaled by 
market value is the dependent variable 
(RDCAP). This approach allows us to 
examine factors that affect the magnitude 
of capitalisation of R&D. 
We follow prior literature, such as 
Cazavan-Jeny et al. (2011), Dinh et al. 
(2015) and Oswald (2008), in the choice of 
firm-level factors that may affect the 
decision or magnitude of R&D 
capitalisation. These include factors that 
capture a firm’s life cycle and risk such as 
its size (Size), book to market (BM), age 
(Age), leverage (Leverage) and beta 
(Beta). We also include the magnitude of 
R&D expenditure relative to total assets 
(RDInt), as this may affect the decision 
about capitalising R&D and factors that 
capture whether a firm meets 
capitalisation criteria such as the market 
value of the firm generated in relation to 
R&D (RDValue). We also include variables 
that capture a firm’s incentives to 
manipulate earnings to meet or beat 
earnings benchmarks, such as last year’s 
earnings (PastBeat) or zero (ZeroBeat). 
International sales (IntSalesPerc) are 
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included as a proxy for a firm’s 
international exposure. Further, we 
include a number of country-level 
determinants, because they may also 
affect a firm’s decision and magnitude  
of R&D capitalisation: corruption 
(Corruption), audit and enforcement 
(AudEnf), investor protection 
(InvProtection), anti-self-dealing index 
(AntiselfDeal), and an indicator variable 
indicating whether a country is classified 
as civil or common law (CivCom). Country-
level controls also include the country-
level balance of trade (Baloftrade), skilled 
labour (SkilledLabour), distribution 
(DitriInfra), energy (EnerInfra) and health 
(HeatlhInfra) infrastructure, given that 
these may influence the overall levels of 
R&D activity in a given country.9 Finally, 
our multivariate analysis includes industry 
and year fixed effects while we cluster 
standard errors at the firm level. The 
relationship between R&D capitalisation 
and the corresponding associated 
determinants can be expressed as follows:
CAP or RDCAP = f(Size, BM, Age, 
Leverage, Beta, RDInt, RDValue, PastBeat, 
ZeroBeat IntSalesPerc, Corruption, 
AudEnf, InvProtection, AntiselfDeal, 
CivCom, Baloftrade, SkilledLabour, 
DitriInfra, EnerInfra, HeatlhInfra)
(1)
The second aim of this Phase is to 
investigate whether, given firm-specific 
characteristics, firms follow the expected 
accounting treatment of R&D (ie 
capitalisation vs expensing). This involves 
the following two steps. 
The first aim of this 
Phase is to identify 
the factors that affect 
a firm’s decision to 
capitalise development 
costs, and the amounts 
capitalised. 
9 Appendix I presents the definitions and source of all variables used in all models in this report. 
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Finally, we define the variable 
CAPexpected as a dummy variable  
that takes the value of 1 if a firm is 
expected (not expected) to capitalise 
R&D based on CAPpred and effectively 
does (does not) capitalise R&D based  
on CAP, and 0 otherwise. 
With regard to the level of capitalisation, 
as a subsequent test, we concentrate on 
those firm-year observations that we 
would expect to be capitalisers on the 
basis of Step Two above and actually did 
(did not) do so, and identify the expected 
amount of development costs that one 
would expect them to have capitalised 
(expensed). To do so, we run another 
model for each industry-year cluster  
with standard errors clustered at the  
firm level as follows:11
RDCAP = f(Size, BM, Age, Leverage, 
Beta, RDInt, RDValue, PastBeat, ZeroBeat 
IntSalesPerc, Corruption, AudEnf, 
InvProtection, AntiselfDeal, CivCom, 
Baloftrade, SkilledLabour, DitriInfra, 
EnerInfra, HeatlhInfra)
(2)
where RDCAP is the amount of R&D 
capitalised in each year; firm controls  
are: book to market (BM), R&D value 
(RDValue), R&D intensity (RDInt), size 
(Size), beta (Beta), leverage (Leverage), 
percentage of international sales 
(IntSalesPerc), age (Age) and two proxies 
capturing incentives to manage earnings 
in an attempt to meet earnings 
benchmarks (PastBeat and ZeroBeat).  
We define the variable RDCAPpred as  
the amount of R&D that is expected to  
be capitalised on the basis of the fitted 
values of this Tobit model. Conversely, 
the residuals identify the unexpected 
R&D that firms capitalise (RDCAPunexp). 
It is noted that RDCAPunexp can be 
either positive or negative, identifying 
firms that overcapitalise or 
undercapitalise respectively. 
Step One
First, following Oswald (2008) and Oswald 
and Zarowin (2007), we identify the firms 
that expense all their R&D costs and we 
would anticipate them doing so as 
‘mandatory expensers’, where:10
a)  the firm expenses all its R&D costs and 
all other firms in the same industry and 
in the same year do the same; we 
interpret the absence of R&D 
capitalisation in an industry-year 
cluster as a signal that firms belonging 
to that cluster should expense R&D 
b)  the firm’s RDValue is negative; the 
numerator of RDValue is defined as the 
difference between market value and 
book value of equity; thus, a negative 
RDValue implies that book value is 
higher than the market value of equity 
and we interpret this gap/difference as 
a signal that R&D is perceived by the 
market (and the companies’ themselves) 
as having no future economic benefit 
and thus should not be capitalised 
c)  the RDValue of an expenser is lower 
than the minimum RDValue of a 
capitaliser in the same industry/year; 
this ensures that the remaining 
expensers are at least as successful in 
R&D as the least successful capitaliser. 
Step Two
Second, we examine whether any of the 
remaining expensers or those that have 
capitalised (all or part of their R&D costs) 
could be classified in the alternative 
category. To do so, we rely on the 
econometric model (1) that we have used 
earlier to assess a firm’s decision to 
capitalise R&D. When running this model, 
one can obtain the fitted values that will 
suggest the probability that a firm will be a 
capitaliser, given its specific characteristics 
(ie control variables). Having done so, we 
define the variable CAPpred as 1 if the 
predicted probability of being a capitaliser 
is higher than 50%, and 0 otherwise. 
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Second, we examine 
whether any of the 
remaining expensers 
or those that have 
capitalised (all or part of 
their R&D costs) could 
be classified in the 
alternative category. 
10  Because the inclusion of these firms in the empirical implementation of Model 1 may bias the results of the estimation, we re-run our estimations excluding them. The results are qualitatively 
similar and, for brevity, not presented.
11 We run a cross-sectional (ie for each industry and year) Tobit model instead of a pooled model, for consistency with the earnings management literature (eg Kothari et al. 2005). 
3.3 PHASE 2 – SAMPLE SELECTION
In order to examine the quantity of 
narrative R&D disclosures in annual 
reports, we select a sub-sample of the 
20,847 observations identified in Phase 1. 
More specifically, we follow a strategic 
sampling approach and rank all firms in 
each country-year-industry cluster by their 
R&D intensity12 and retain the first firm in 
every industry as a starting point, then the 
fifth, the ninth, and so on. We rank firms 
on the basis of R&D intensity in order to 
ensure that our sample includes 
companies with varying levels of R&D and 
therefore reflects not only the importance 
of R&D investment on the operations of a 
firm but also the potential correlation 
between the disclosure levels that are 
identified in this stage. Following this 
procedure yields 6,163 firm-year 
observations. Requiring the financial 
statements and/or narratives in the 
annual report to be available, in the 
English language, and be editable (ie not 
in picture format) to allow character 
recognition reduces the sub-sample to 
3,402 financial statements and 3,171 
narratives sections.13 Of these, we were 
able to obtain both sections for 3,039 
observations in total (ie having a full 
annual report). 
3.4 PHASE 2 – METHODS APPLIED
The first aim of this Phase is to investigate 
the quantity of narrative R&D disclosures 
and obtain evidence from the separate 
sections of the annual reports in which 
R&D is discussed. We measure the 
quantity of narrative R&D disclosures by 
using a computerised content analysis. 
Specifically, we develop a list of common 
R&D keywords. Our starting point of 
keywords is the list used in Merkley 
(2014), which we supplement with 
keywords related to the capitalisation 
criteria. To assure the latter, we consult 
other prior studies (ie  Chen et al. 2017; 
Guo et al. 2004; Jones 2007; La Rosa and 
Liberatore 2014; Nekhili et al. 2016;) and 
we read IAS 38 thoroughly.14 Appendix II 
presents the full list of the 116 keywords 
we use in this study. 
Subsequently, we use MaxQDA software, 
and in particular the MaxDictio application 
of MaxQDA, to search each annual report 
and identify the number of times each 
firm makes reference to each of the words 
in our list. We then measure the total 
R&D-related disclosures as the sum of the 
number of times each firm makes 
reference to each of the words in our list. 
We perform this task separately for the 
front-end of an annual report up to and 
excluding the financial statements and 
the back-end of the annual report, which 
consists of the auditors’ report and the 
financial statements as well as the notes 
to the accounts. In the analysis part of this 
report, we refer to the former as the 
‘narratives’ section of the annual report 
and the latter as the ‘financial statements’ 
section. Then, we examine determinant 
factors for the volume of R&D-related 
disclosures. Multivariate regression 
analysis is therefore carried out, with the 
dependent variable being the R&D-related 
disclosures. Independent variables include 
those used in the multivariate analysis 
carried out for Phase 1. The relationship 
between R&D-related disclosures and the 
determinants can be expressed as follows:
RDDISCLOSURE = f(Size, BM, Age, 
Leverage, Beta, RDInt, RDValue, PastBeat, 
ZeroBeat IntSalesPerc, Corruption, 
AudEnf, InvProtection, AntiselfDeal, 
CivCom, Baloftrade, SkilledLabour, 
DitriInfra, EnerInfra, HeatlhInfra)
(3)
3.5 PHASE 3 – METHOD APPLIED
Phase 3 of the research centres upon 
capturing the key stakeholders’ views on 
R&D accounting and reporting: these are 
the two main groups of stakeholders from 
a supply perspective (ie account 
preparers and auditors) and one from the 
demand or user perspective (ie equity 
investors). This approach captures the 
supply chain of information between 
company and shareholders (Campbell 
and Slack 2011) and by its engagement 
with senior participants across these 
groups it results in a unique project.  
22
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The first aim of this 
Phase is to investigate 
the quantity of narrative 
R&D disclosures and 
obtain evidence from the 
separate sections of the 
annual reports in which 
R&D is discussed.
12 Following prior literature (eg Cazavan-Jeny et al. 2011; Franzen et al. 2007; Oswald 2008), R&D intensity is defined as the ratio of R&D expenditure to total assets.
13  When an annual report was not available at the company’s website, we searched for the corresponding annual report using a Google search and the database Perfect Information.  Merkley (2014) 
develops the list of keywords for US companies reporting under the US GAAP, which disallows the capitalisation of R&D. In contrast, we use a sample of firms that report under IFRS, which permit 
the capitalisation of R&D and thus we supplement with relevant keywords. 
14 Richard Martin and Alan Teixeira also helpfully commented on the constituents of this list.
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et al. 2006). In order to gain access to 
individuals in these groups, as suggested 
by Buchanan et al. (1988), we followed 
methods employed by Armitage and 
Marston (2008) and Beasley et al. (2009). 
In the first instance, we approached 
potential interviewees identified through 
personal contacts and networks, a 
process that was instrumental in helping 
to secure access to interviewees across 
the three stakeholder groups. This was 
supplemented with a member Web 
survey by ACCA, part of which asked  
for participation by preparers in the 
research, and with suggestions from the 
roundtable discussion. 
Each potential interviewee was contacted 
by email by a member of the research 
team to outline the scope of the research 
and to agree interview timing and 
logistics. An overview of the project and 
the issues to consider was provided in the 
email (see Appendix III). All the 
interviewees were assured anonymity of 
person and institution. This was re-
affirmed at the commencement of the 
respective interview and each participant 
agreed to speak freely on IAS 38 and the 
capitalisation of development costs.  
Each interview addressed three key areas 
outlined in the project briefing note, which 
were consistent with those shown above. 
This provided consistency within, and 
where appropriate between, the interviews 
across the three respective groups. 
All the interviews were conducted 
between April and June 2018. The 
interviews were conducted by one of the 
research team who was highly familiar 
with this as a technique for elucidating 
insight and reflective comments from 
interviewees. For logistical reasons, for 
the UK-based interviewees, where 
possible, interviews were arranged in the 
London office of the interviewee. For 
overseas interviews, skype was 
predominantly used. This enabled 
face-to-face contact so as to replicate as 
far as possible the interview conditions of 
those conducted in person. Two 
interviews were by phone owing to a lack 
of skype connection. 
To help provide a meaningful 
understanding of the stakeholders’ views, 
the research was designed and 
conducted through semi-structured, 
in-depth interviews. This approach not 
only allowed the interviewees to express 
their opinions on a number of pre-
determined topics but also allowed us to 
probe further those issues that needed 
clarification and for the interviewees to 
elaborate on aspects of IAS 38 which they 
said were important (Slack and 
Tsalavoutas 2018; Stubbs and Higgins 
2015; Stubbs et al. 2016;). Indeed, 
reflecting on the use of interviews, Stoner 
and Holland (2004) affirm that such 
qualitative research methods allow rich 
insight into research fields. 
An initial series of interview questions 
were informed by the preliminary findings 
from Phases 1 and 2 and the relevant 
literature. Additionally, the preliminary 
findings were presented at a roundtable 
discussion event hosted by ACCA in April 
2018. The event included auditors, 
preparers and investors. On the basis of 
these discussions, the interview questions 
were further developed and finalised.15 
These covered three key areas.
i.  Why R&D is important; the relevance 
of R&D accounting treatment to R&D 
spend; and whether capitalisation 
sends a signal to stakeholders. 
ii.  The accounting treatment of R&D; 
prudence versus faithful representation 
and the recognition of R&D assets; 
preparer and auditor views on 
expensing and the assurance of 
capitalisation; comparison to US GAAP.
iii.  Disclosure; views on minimal 
mandatory disclosure requirements; 
R&D voluntary disclosure usefulness; 
trade-off between disclosure and 
proprietary information.
Our study required in-depth discussions 
with senior participants across two 
primary groups and one supplementary 
group, all of which are traditionally 
difficult–to-reach individuals (Campbell 
and Slack 2011; Pettigrew 1992; Roberts 
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To help provide 
a meaningful 
understanding of the 
stakeholders’ views, the 
research was designed 
and conducted through 
semi-structured, in-
depth interviews.
15 Comments from this event are also reflected in the presentation of the findings in section 4.
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All the interviews 
were carried out in 
jurisdictions with IAS 
38 reporting, primarily 
within the EU, with the 
majority (owing to ease 
of access) in the UK.
In total, 14 interviews were conducted 
with 16 participants. Two of the interviews 
were attended by two participants. The 
interviewees comprised six auditors, six 
equity investors/analysts and four 
preparers. On average, the interview 
length was nearly 40 minutes, with a 
maximum length of 55 minutes and a 
minimum of 26 minutes. Of those 
interviewees who were equity investors, 
all were either lead portfolio/fund 
managers or holders of a senior position 
in equity analysis. For auditors, the 
interviewees were predominantly audit 
and technical partners in international 
accounting and audit firms with direct 
involvement with IAS application and 
audit. Finally, for preparers, all held senior 
positions ranging from finance director to 
chief accountant and all had direct 
financial reporting responsibilities. All the 
interviews were carried out in jurisdictions 
with IAS 38 reporting, primarily within the 
EU, with the majority (owing to ease of 
access) in the UK. Details of the respective 
participant cohorts are shown in Table 3.4. 
With the permission of each interviewee, 
all the interviews were recorded and 
subsequently transcribed for analysis.  
All the transcribed interviews were then 
coded by the interviewee to enable key 
verbatim quotations to be identified, 
highlighting common, or divergent, 
views. All the interviewees were coded Ix 
(for investors) and Px (for preparers) and 
Ax (for auditors), in chronological order. 
The transcripts were read by the lead 
interview researcher to gain familiarity 
with the general findings across all the 
interviews and, where necessary, to 
re-listen to key parts of the interview for 
emphasis. This was discussed in detail 
across the research team, who met prior to 
the subsequent analysis of the transcripts. 
A general coding template was produced 
highlighting the key recurring themes from 
the interviews. A detailed manual thematic 
analysis of the interview data was then 
undertaken identifying relevant quotes 
pertaining to the coding themes and 
isolating any other emerging themes from 
the detailed review of the data (Boyatzis 
1998; Miles and Huberman 1994). The 
analysis of the transcripts is founded on the 
identification of ‘interpretative repertoires’ 
(Potter and Wetherell 1987) and in the 
findings we provide verbatim illustrative 
quotes identified through this process. 
This analysis is consistent with the staged 
approach suggested by Easterby-Smith 
et al. (1991) and used in other interview-
based research (Armitage and Marston 
2008; Campbell and Slack 2011; Slack and 
Tsalavoutas 2018; Solomon et al. 2011). 
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TABLE 3.4: Summary of interviewees
INTERVIEWEE GROUP/CODING POSITION HELD LOCATION
Auditor
A1 Technical partner UK
A2 Associate partner UK
A3 Partner UK
A4 Financial accounting Advisory UK
A5 Partner Italy
A6 Partner Germany
Equity Investment*
I1 Vice president UK
I2 Managing director, Global research UK
I3 Director, Global research UK
I4 Portfolio director UK
I5 Equity research analyst UK
I6 Portfolio investor UK
Preparers
P1 Finance director Hong Kong
P2 Finance director Sweden
P3 Finance director UK
P4 Senior accountant Italy
*UK based but all covering global equity investment.
The findings are presented across the 
three research phases separately.
4.1 PHASE 1 – DECISION TO 
CAPITALISE DEVELOPMENT COSTS 
AND AMOUNT CAPITALISED
As reported in Table 3.1, of the 20,475 
observations in the sample, 12,746 (62%) 
fully expense R&D costs (expensers). The 
remaining 7,729 observations, partially 
capitalise (5,266; 28%) or fully capitalise 
(2,103; 10%) their R&D costs (capitalisers). 
This tendency towards expensing was 
specifically commented upon at the 
roundtable discussion. Participants raised 
concerns about the invisibility of potential 
assets, despite the importance of 
intangibles such R&D for value creation. 
Table 4.1 presents the descriptive 
statistics for the variables included in 
Model 1, shown separately for capitalisers 
and expensers. We also compare the 
mean (median) values of each variable 
across the two groups through a T-test 
(Mann-Whitney test).16 Before we outline 
the key observations from these 
descriptive statistics, it is noted that that 
these descriptive statistics are taken in 
isolation of one another. Hence, some 
findings may seem contradictory if viewed 
as interdependent. 
4. Findings  
and discussion
25
With respect to firm-level characteristics, 
the results indicate that, compared with 
expensers, capitalisers tend to: 
P  exhibit greater R&D intensity (mean 
RDInt = 0.040 for expensers vs. mean 
RDInt = 0.052 for capitalisers; p<0.01)
P  be smaller in size mean (Size = 14.569 
for expensers vs. mean Size = 14.025 
for capitalisers; p<0.01)
P  be more leveraged (mean Leverage = 
0.616 for expensers vs. mean Leverage 
= 0.709 for capitalisers; p<0.01)
P  be more international (mean 
IntSalesPerc = 40.939 for expensers  
vs. mean IntSalesPerc = 46.264 for 
capitalisers; p<0.01)
P  have used their discretion and 
capitalised R&D in order to meet or 
beat last year’s earnings (mean 
PastBeat = 0.159 for expensers vs. 
mean PastBeat = 0.275 for capitalisers; 
p<0.01) or the zero threshold (mean 
ZeroBeat = 0.044 for expensers vs. 
mean ZeroBeat = 0.133 for capitalisers; 
p<0.01)
With respect to country-level 
characteristics, T-test and Mann-Whitney 
tests indicate that, compared with 
expensers, capitalisers tend to operate in 
countries with: 
P  higher levels of audit and enforcement 
(mean AudEnf = 40.241 for expensers 
vs. mean AudEnf = 42.096 for 
capitalisers; p<0.01); 
P  higher levels of investor protection 
(mean InvProtection = 3.451 for 
expensers vs. mean InvProtection = 
3.639 for capitalisers; p<0.01); 
P  higher levels of corruption (mean 
Corruption = 0.998 for expensers vs. 
mean Corruption = 0.999 for 
capitalisers; p<0.10); 
P  a civil law legal system (mean CivCom 
= 0.645 for expensers vs. mean CivCom 
= 0.680 for capitalisers; p<0.01); 
P  higher levels of health infrastructure 
(mean HeatlhInfra = 6.176 for 
expensers vs. mean HeatlhInfra = 6.553 
for capitalisers; p<0.01). 
16  In Appendix IV, we provide the descriptive statistics for capitalisers that expense some portion of the R&D expenditure (ie non-full capitalisers) and those that capitalise all their R&D expenditure 
(full capitalisers). In summary, firms that capitalise all their R&D expenditure tend to be smaller, exhibit lower R&D intensity, are more levered, are less international and are less likely to have 
managed earnings than those that do not capitalise all R&D expenditure. With respect to country-level characteristics, companies capitalising all their R&D expenditure tend to operate in countries 
with higher audit and enforcement, higher investor protection and are less likely to operate in countries with a civil law legal system than companies that do not capitalise all R&D expenditure.
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TABLE 4.1: Descriptive statistics of capitalisers and expensers
EXPENSERS (12,746) CAPITALISERS (7,729) COMPARISON
Mean St. Dev. Min Median Max Mean St. Dev. Min Median Max T-test
Mann-
Whitney 
test
RDExp 0.035 0.062 0.000 0.012 0.393 0.037 0.068 0.000 0.010 0.393 0.002** –0.002***
RDCap 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.023 0.040 0.000 0.007 0.188 0.023*** 0.007***
BM 0.747 0.744 0.049 0.500 4.302 0.767 0.732 0.049 0.543 4.302 0.020** 0.043***
RDValue 112.251 446.763 –706.516 12.088 3170.823 65.189 349.485 –706.516 6.554 3170.823 –47.062*** –5.534***
RDInt 0.040 0.079 0.000 0.013 0.471 0.052 0.077 0.000 0.024 0.471 0.012*** 0.011***
RDInt(sales) 0.219 1.044 0.000 0.017 8.289 0.150 0.753 0.000 0.030 8.289 –0.069*** 0.013***
Size 14.569 2.933 6.494 14.756 25.289 14.025 3.261 5.628 13.742 26.159 –0.544*** –1.014***
Beta 0.905 0.918 –1.710 0.892 3.770 0.895 0.917 –1.710 0.869 3.770 –0.010 –0.023
Leverage 0.616 0.936 0.000 0.324 6.207 0.709 1.021 0.000 0.397 6.207 0.093*** 0.073***
IntSalesPerc 40.939 36.201 0.000 35.745 100.000 46.264 34.871 0.000 46.460 100.000 5.325*** 10.715***
PastBeat 0.159 0.366 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.275 0.447 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.116*** 0.000***
ZeroBeat 0.044 0.204 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.133 0.339 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.089*** 0.000***
BenchBeat 0.186 0.389 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.340 0.474 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.154*** 0.000***
Age 15.043 10.652 1.000 13.000 51.000 15.014 10.516 1.000 13.000 52.000 –0.029 0.000
AudEnf 40.241 10.503 9.000 37.000 54.000 42.096 9.908 9.000 44.000 54.000 1.855*** 7***
InvProtection 3.451 1.482 1.000 3.500 5.000 3.639 1.298 1.000 3.500 5.000 0.188*** 0.000***
AntiselfDeal 0.624 0.243 0.165 0.653 1.000 0.591 0.255 0.172 0.469 1.000 –0.033*** –0.184***
CivCom 0.645 0.479 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.680 0.467 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.035*** 0.000***
Corruption 0.998 0.042 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.999 0.030 0.000 1.000 1.000 –0.001* 0.000
Baloftrade –0.805 7.918 –46.497 1.865 25.400 –0.421 6.413 –31.277 0.730 25.400 0.384*** –1.135***
DitriInfra 7.727 1.165 2.840 7.714 9.565 7.777 1.130 2.840 7.820 9.565 0.050*** 0.106***
EnerInfra 6.810 1.479 0.679 6.895 9.434 6.882 1.292 0.679 6.835 9.434 0.072*** –0.060
HeatlhInfra 6.176 1.802 1.510 6.750 9.529 6.553 1.593 1.510 6.946 9.529 0.377*** 0.196***
SkilledLabour 5.737 0.881 1.877 5.750 8.275 5.766 0.825 1.877 5.780 8.275 0.029*** 0.030***
Definitions and source of all the variables are reported in Appendix I.
Figure 4.1 plots the percentage of 
firm-year observations of those expensing 
and capitalising R&D, by country, for 
those countries in our sample 
represented by 100 or more observations 
(see Table 3.2). We note a more or less 
equal split of firms between the two 
categories of capitalisers and expensers 
in Brazil, Denmark, France, Malaysia and 
the UK. In countries such as Belgium, Italy, 
Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden, the 
majority of the firms tend to capitalise 
(some or all) R&D rather than expense it, 
while firms from the remaining countries 
in our sample exhibit a tendency towards 
expensing their R&D expenditure.  
Figure 4.2 plots the percentage of 
firm-year observations expensing and 
capitalising R&D, by industry. The 
constituents of the Consumer Services, 
Financial, and Technology industries 
exhibit a more or less equal split between 
firms capitalising and expensing R&D 
expenditure. The constituents in the 
remaining industries, namely Basic 
Materials, Consumer Goods, Health  
Care, Industrials, Telecommunications 
and Utilities, appear to have a  
tendency towards expensing R&D  
rather than capitalising.
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We note a more or 
less equal split of 
firms between the two 
categories of capitalisers 
and expensers in Brazil, 
Denmark, France, 
Malaysia and the UK.
FIGURE 4.1: Percentage of expensers and capitalisers by country
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FIGURE 4.2: Percentage of expensers and capitalisers by industry
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We find a positive and significant 
coefficient for leverage (Leverage) in all 
models, consistent with the univariate 
results presented earlier. Given that 
leverage is a proxy for the restrictiveness 
of debt covenants as motivators of 
capitalisation (eg Aboody and Lev 1998), 
the positive coefficient suggests that 
managers have incentives to capitalise 
R&D in order to meet debt covenants. 
Further, in line with the univariate results 
presented earlier, IntSalesPerc has 
positive and significant coefficients in all 
models, suggesting that firms that are 
more international exhibit a greater 
incidence of capitalisation and capitalise 
greater amounts of R&D. Finally, we also 
find that firms with greater R&D intensity 
exhibit a lower incidence of capitalisation 
but capitalise greater amounts. 
With regard to country-level influential 
factors, the decision and magnitude of 
capitalisation of R&D is positively 
associated with the country-level of audit 
and enforcement (AudEnf), investor 
protection (InvProtection), corruption 
(Corruption), health infrastructure 
(HeatlhInfra) and civil law legal system 
(CivCom) consistent with the univariate 
results presented earlier. Further, we find 
that the decision and magnitude of 
capitalisation of R&D is positively 
associated with the anti-self-dealing 
index (AntiselfDeal). In contrast, 
distribution and energy infrastructure 
(DitriInfr and EnerInfra respectively) affect 
the decision negatively and reduce the 
amount of R&D capitalised.
As final point, we note that we have 
repeated this analysis by excluding the 
countries that are represented by fewer 
than 100 observations in the sample, and 
results remain almost identical.
As the univariate analysis provided earlier 
does not necessarily identify influential 
factors associated with the decision to 
capitalise R&D, Table 4.2 provides four 
models of multivariate analysis presenting 
the empirical implementation of Equation 
1. The dependent variables are the 
decision to capitalise (Models 1 and 2) 
and the amount of development costs 
capitalised (Models 3 and 4). The models 
are presented twice, using alternative 
measures to proxy for incentives to 
manipulate earnings by capitalising R&D. 
Specifically, Models 2 and 4 employ 
PastBeat and ZeroBeat while Models 1 
and 3 use BenchBeat, which combines 
PastBeat and ZeroBeat. 
According to Table 4.2, size (Size) has a 
negative coefficient, statistically significant 
across all models. This result is consistent 
with the univariate results presented 
earlier and suggests that larger firms 
exhibit a lower incidence of capitalisation 
and capitalise proportionately less than 
smaller firms. This finding confirms the 
findings in the previous literature (eg 
Cazavan-Jenny et al. 2011; Oswald, 2008) 
and is indicative that larger firms tend to 
perform more basic research or 
maintenance and upgrades to their 
products. Further, for smaller firms, it is 
likely that a capitalisation decision would 
have a more material bearing on the 
overall financial statements and hence 
would have a more pronounced effect.
In line with the univariate results 
presented earlier, the coefficients of 
BenchBeat, PastBeat, ZeroBeat, which 
proxy for earnings-management 
incentives, are positive and significant in 
all four models. These results are 
consistent with the use of discretion 
inherent in the capitalisation criteria for 
recognising R&D on the balance sheet 
and thus, increasing reported earnings 
and subsequently beating or meeting 
current-period earnings targets. 
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For smaller firms, 
it is likely that a 
capitalisation decision 
would have a more 
material bearing on 
the overall financial 
statements and hence 
would have a more 
pronounced effect.
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TABLE 4.2: Multivariate analysis (decision and magnitude of development costs capitalisation)
DECISION TO CAPITALISE R&D MAGNITUDE OF CAPITALISATION
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
BM –0.021
(–0.81)
–0.036
(–1.43)
0.011***
(8.08)
0.010***
(7.76)
RDValue –0.000*
(–1.88)
–0.000**
(–2.16)
0.000
(1.30)
0.000
(0.71)
RDInt –0.857***
(–3.31)
–1.203***
(–4.55)
0.097***
(7.15)
0.075***
(5.70)
Size –0.026***
(–2.84)
–0.024***
(–2.60)
–0.002***
(–4.96)
–0.002***
(–4.56)
Beta 0.015
(1.26)
0.015
(1.31)
0.000
(0.81)
0.000
(0.83)
Leverage 0.090***
(5.35)
0.085***
(5.06)
0.006***
(8.51)
0.005***
(8.03)
IntSalesPerc 0.002***
(3.16)
0.002***
(3.16)
0.000***
(3.42)
0.000***
(3.40)
BenchBeat 0.442***
(16.78)
0.022***
(17.59)
PastBeat 0.335***
(12.34)
0.014***
(12.63)
ZeroBeat 0.601***
(12.72)
0.036***
(15.69)
Age 0.007
(0.32)
0.004
(0.18)
0.000
(0.20)
–0.000
(–0.11)
AudEnf 0.021***
(5.86)
0.022***
(5.95)
0.001***
(4.75)
0.001***
(4.96)
InvProtection 0.155***
(5.59)
0.153***
(5.53)
0.005***
(4.71)
0.005***
(4.54)
AntiselfDeal 0.616***
(3.43)
0.597***
(3.32)
0.025***
(3.89)
0.023***
(3.62)
CivCom 0.985***
(8.76)
0.970***
(8.62)
0.031***
(6.99)
0.028***
(6.66)
Corruption 0.743**
(2.07)
0.741**
(2.08)
0.010
(0.52)
0.010
(0.53)
Baloftrade 0.004
(1.35)
0.005
(1.43)
0.000**
(2.02)
0.000**
(2.16)
DitriInfra –0.203***
(–5.71)
–0.201***
(–5.63)
–0.006***
(–4.93)
–0.006***
(–4.81)
EnerInfra –0.081***
(–2.91)
–0.083***
(–2.98)
–0.003***
(–2.89)
–0.003***
(–3.05)
HeatlhInfra 0.116***
(4.04)
0.116***
(4.04)
0.004***
(3.77)
0.004***
(3.78)
SkilledLabour –0.023
(–0.82)
–0.025
(–0.87)
–0.002
(–1.52)
–0.002
(–1.63)
Constant –2.489***
(–5.01)
–2.477***
(–5.01)
0.043***
(42.32)
0.042***
(42.89)
Observations
chi2/F
r2_p
20,475
869.710
0.091
20,475
921.160
0.096
20,475
21.900
–0.382
20,475
24.036
–0.429
t statistics in parentheses. Industry and year fixed effects included but not shown. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Definitions and source of all the variables are reported in Appendix I. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Similarly, we split the sample between 
firms with low and high international 
exposure. Overall, we do not observe any 
major differences in the influential factors 
between firms with different levels of 
international exposure. The exception is 
that R&D intensity appears to negatively 
affect a firm’s decision to capitalise R&D 
only for the sub-sample of firms with low 
international exposure (this suggests that 
the corresponding finding for the overall 
sample is driven by this sub-sample). 
Expected and unexpected accounting 
treatment of R&D 
Following the procedure described in 
section 3.2, from the 12,746 expensers in 
our sample, we identify 2,963 firm-year 
observations as ‘mandatory expensers’. 
Thus, the remaining 17,512 firm-year 
observations in our sample could 
potentially capitalise some development 
costs. Further, we identify 4,053 (7,737) 
firm-year observations that are expected 
to capitalise (expense) R&D and actually 
capitalise (expense). Finally, we identify 
1,945 (3,513) firm-year observations that 
are expected to capitalise (expense) R&D 
and expense (capitalise) R&D instead. 
Effectively, the tendency is for firms that 
follow an unexpected treatment of R&D 
costs to capitalise development costs 
instead of expensing (arguably, from this, 
such companies are over-capitalising). We 
summarise this information in Table 4.3. 
Further, we examine the cross-sectional 
variation of the determinants of the 
decision and amount of R&D capitalised 
and focus on sub-samples based on 
firm-level earnings, management 
incentives and internationalisation.  
This allows us to examine whether the 
influential factors explaining the decision 
or magnitude of R&D capitalisation differ 
when firms have incentives to manage 
earnings and are more international  
(and vice versa). 
In untabulated tests, we split the sample 
into those firms with greater incentives  
to manage earnings and those with  
lesser incentives to engage in earnings 
management to meet or beat earnings 
targets, and on this basis we re-estimate 
model (1). This allows us to examine 
whether the influential factors identified 
above have a differential impact in firms 
that have higher incentives to manage 
earnings compared with those that  
have lower incentives to do this. Overall, 
we find no such differential effect. The  
only exception is size, which remains 
negative and significant for firms with  
less incentive to manipulate earnings  
but insignificant for those firms with 
incentives to manage earnings.  
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Effectively, the tendency 
is for firms that follow 
an unexpected treatment 
of R&D costs to capitalise 
development costs 
instead of expensing 
(arguably, from this, 
such companies are 
over-capitalising).
TABLE 4.3: Companies following the ‘expected’ accounting treatment
EXPENSERS CAPITALISERS
Mandatory expensers Potential capitalisers
Full sample (20,475) 2,963 9,783 7,729
Expected method 
(11,953)
– 7,737 4,053
Unexpected method 
(5,559)
– 1,945
(ie they were expected to 
capitalise)
3,513
(ie they were expected to 
expense)
Unable to estimate 101 163
Figure 4.3 plots the percentage of 
firm-year observations indicating 
adoption of an unexpected treatment for 
R&D accounting, by country, for those 
countries in our sample represented by 
100 or more observations (see Table 3.2). 
Firms from China, India, and Turkey have 
the highest percentage of unexpected 
capitalisers. Further, companies from 
China, Finland, Greece, and India, South 
Africa and Turkey have the lowest 
percentage of unexpected expensers. 
Figure 4.4 plots the percentage of 
firm-year observations indicating 
adoption of an unexpected treatment for 
R&D accounting, by industry. We note 
that firms in the Basic Materials, 
Consumer Goods, Telecommunications 
and Utilities industries present the lowest 
percentages of unexpected expensers. 
On the other hand, firms in the Basic 
Materials, Telecommunications and 
Utilities industries have the highest 
percentages of unexpected capitalisers.  
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We note that firms in 
the Basic Materials, 
Consumer Goods, 
Telecommunications 
and Utilities industries 
present the lowest 
percentages of 
unexpected expensers.
FIGURE 4.3: Percentage of unexpected expensers and capitalisers by country
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FIGURE 4.4: Percentage of unexpected expensers and capitalisers by industry
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p<0.01), exhibit greater R&D intensity 
(mean RDInt = 0.057 vs. mean RDInt = 
0.047; p<0.01), are more leveraged (mean 
Leverage = 0.776 vs. mean Leverage = 
0.604; p<0.01), older (mean Age = 2.462 
vs. mean Age = 2.364; p<0.01), have more 
international exposure (mean IntSalesPerc 
= 43.339 vs. mean IntSalesPerc = 49.038; 
p<0.01) and are smaller in size (mean Size 
= 13.413 vs. mean Size = 14.706; p<0.01). 
Panel C of Table 4.4 presents the 
descriptive statistics of key variables for 
the expensers that are expected to 
capitalise and Panel D for expensers that 
are expected to expense. We observe 
that expensers that are expected to 
capitalise, relative to those that are 
expected to expense, tend to have 
greater growth opportunities (mean BM = 
0.649 vs. mean BM = 0.372; p<0.01), 
greater R&D intensity (mean RDInt = 
0.064 vs. mean RDInt = 0.043; p<0.01), are 
smaller in size (mean Size = 13.675 vs. 
mean Size = 14.983 p<0.01), are more 
internationally exposed (mean 
IntSalesPerc = 50.871 vs. mean 
IntSalesPerc = 38.802; p<0.01) and are 
older (mean Age = 2.403 vs. mean Age = 
2.337; p<0.01 – note these are the 
logarithmic transformations of age). 
In Table 4.4, we report descriptive 
statistics for key firm-level variables 
employed in Equation 1 for firms that 
capitalise/expense and are expected/not 
expected to do so. Specifically, Panel A of 
Table 4.4 presents the descriptive 
statistics of the relevant variables for the 
capitalisers that are expected to 
capitalise. On average, these firms 
appear to capitalise 0.034 of the R&D 
expenditure relative to their market 
values while, given their characteristics, 
one would expect them to capitalise on 
average 0.043 of their expenditure 
relative to their market values. Thus, it 
appears that these firms tend to capitalise 
lower amounts than expected. 
In contrast, as shown in Panel B of Table 
4.4, capitalisers that are expected to 
expense tend to capitalise smaller 
amounts on average (0.010). T-test and 
Mann-Whitney tests indicate that the 
amount of R&D capitalised by firms that 
are expected to expense are statistically 
and significantly smaller than those 
capitalised by firms that are expected to 
capitalise. Further, capitalisers that are 
expected to capitalise, relative to 
capitalisers that are expected to expense, 
tend to have higher growth opportunities 
(mean BM = 1.091 vs. mean BM = 0.365; 
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In Table 4.4, we report 
descriptive statistics for 
key firm-level variables 
employed in Equation 1 
for firms that capitalise/
expense and are 
expected/not expected  
to do so.
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Table 4.4: Descriptive statistics across expected and unexpected R&D accounting treatment
Mean St. Dev. Min Median Max Mean St. Dev. Min Median Max COMPARISON
PANEL A: CAPITALISERS THAT ARE  
EXPECTED TO CAPITALISE (4,053)
PANEL B: CAPITALISERS THAT ARE  
EXPECTED TO EXPENSE (3,513) T-test
Mann-
Whitney 
test
RDCap 0.034 0.048 0.000 0.015 0.188 0.010 0.022 0.000 0.003 0.188 0.024*** 0.012***
RD_optimal 0.043 0.029 0.001 0.036 0.223 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.043*** 0.036***
RD_unexpected –0.009 0.033 –0.160 –0.015 0.145 0.010 0.022 0.000 0.003 0.188 –0.019*** –0.018***
BM 1.091 0.832 0.049 0.868 4.302 0.365 0.213 0.049 0.328 1.397 0.726*** 0.540***
RDValue 0.044 174.609 –706.516 1.014 3170.823 142.396 462.557 –706.516 24.368 3170.823 –142.352*** –23.354***
RDInt 0.057 0.078 0.000 0.028 0.471 0.047 0.076 0.000 0.021 0.471 0.010*** 0.007***
Size 13.413 3.448 5.628 12.723 26.016 14.706 2.838 6.486 14.911 26.159 –1.293*** –2.188***
Beta 0.900 0.937 –1.710 0.860 3.770 0.888 0.892 –1.710 0.875 3.770 0.012 –0.015
Leverage 0.776 1.089 0.000 0.430 6.207 0.604 0.881 0.000 0.339 6.207 0.172*** 0.091***
IntSalesPerc 49.038 33.437 0.000 50.570 100.000 43.339 36.121 0.000 41.410 100.000 5.699*** 9.160***
BenchBeat 0.488 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.174 0.379 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.314*** 0.000***
Age 2.462 0.813 0.000 2.565 3.932 2.364 0.894 0.000 2.565 3.951 0.098*** 0.000***
PANEL C: EXPENSERS THAT ARE  
EXPECTED TO CAPITALISE (1,945)
PANEL D: EXPENSERS THAT ARE  
EXPECTED TO EXPENSE (7,737) T-test
Mann-
Whitney 
test
RDCap 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 – –
RD_optimal 0.025 0.015 0.000 0.023 0.138 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.025*** 0.023***
RD_unexpected –0.025 0.015 –0.138 –0.023 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 –0.025*** –0.023***
BM 0.649 0.252 0.049 0.673 3.094 0.372 0.217 0.049 0.333 1.007 0.277*** 0.340***
RDValue 25.332 132.641 0.005 4.195 3170.823 208.348 537.174 0.006 38.561 3170.823 –183.016*** –34.366***
RDInt 0.064 0.085 0.000 0.030 0.471 0.043 0.086 0.000 0.015 0.471 0.021*** 0.015***
Size 13.675 3.035 6.979 13.345 24.848 14.983 2.650 6.542 15.202 25.289 –1.308*** –1.857***
Beta 0.899 0.951 –1.710 0.868 3.770 0.885 0.890 –1.710 0.890 3.770 0.014 –0.022
Leverage 0.650 1.085 0.000 0.305 6.207 0.571 0.904 0.000 0.294 6.207 0.079*** 0.011
IntSalesPerc 50.871 34.708 0.000 55.160 100.000 38.802 36.276 0.000 29.550 100.000 12.069*** 25.610***
BenchBeat 0.458 0.498 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.130 0.336 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.328*** 0.000***
Age 2.403 0.874 0.000 2.565 3.932 2.337 0.928 0.000 2.565 3.932 0.066*** 0.000**
Definitions and source of all the variables are reported in Appendix I.
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Table 4.5: Descriptive statistics comparing over-capitalisers and under-capitalisers
Mean St. Dev. Min Median Max Mean St. Dev. Min Median Max COMPARISON
PANEL A: COMPANIES THAT  
OVER-CAPITALISE (4,473)
PANEL B: COMPANIES THAT  
UNDER-CAPITALISE (5,028) T-test
Mann-
Whitney 
test
RDCap 0.028 0.048 0.000 0.005 0.188 0.009 0.018 0.000 0.002 0.188 0.019*** 0.003***
RD_expected 0.012 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.188 0.033 0.022 0.000 0.029 0.223 –0.021*** –0.029***
RD_unexpected 0.016 0.028 0.000 0.004 0.188 –0.024 0.016 –0.160 –0.022 0.000 0.040*** 0.026***
BM 0.544 0.574 0.049 0.385 4.302 0.897 0.674 0.049 0.750 4.302 –0.353*** –0.365***
RDValue 111.809 414.207 –706.516 14.634 3170.823 9.856 177.277 –706.516 2.666 3170.823 101.953*** 11.968***
RDInt 0.059 0.086 0.000 0.027 0.471 0.050 0.072 0.000 0.023 0.471 0.009*** 0.004***
Size 14.212 3.102 6.073 14.387 26.159 13.709 3.277 5.628 13.132 26.016 0.503*** 1.255***
Beta 0.889 0.921 –1.710 0.870 3.770 0.900 0.924 –1.710 0.865 3.770 –0.011 0.005
Leverage 0.638 0.926 0.000 0.350 6.207 0.728 1.092 0.000 0.381 6.207 –0.09*** –0.031**
IntSalesPerc 45.089 35.539 0.000 44.800 100.000 49.270 34.091 0.000 51.030 100.000 –4.181*** –6.23***
BenchBeat 0.275 0.446 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.446 0.497 0.000 0.000 1.000 –0.171*** 0.000***
Age 2.381 0.869 0.000 2.565 3.951 2.442 0.847 0.000 2.565 3.932 –0.061*** 0.000***
Definitions and source of all the variables are reported in Appendix I.
greater R&D intensity (mean RDInt = 
0.059 vs. mean RDInt = 0.050; p<0.01), are 
bigger in size (mean Size = 14.212 vs. 
mean Size = 13.709 p<0.01), are less 
leveraged (mean Leverage = 0.638 vs. 
mean Leverage = 0.728; p<0.01), have 
less international exposure (mean 
IntSalesPerc = 45.089 vs. mean 
IntSalesPerc = 34.091; p<0.01) and are 
younger (mean Age = 2.381 vs. mean Age 
= 2.442; p<0.01). Interestingly we find that 
companies that over-capitalise also have 
lower growth opportunities (mean BM = 
0.544 vs. mean BM = 0.897; p<0.01). 
Given that capitalisation should signal 
successful R&D projects and thus future 
growth, this suggests that over-
capitalisation is likely to be a result of 
aggressive reporting. 
In Table 4.5, we report descriptive 
statistics splitting the sample between 
firms that over- or under-capitalise R&D. 
These are presented in Panels A and B 
respectively. We derive the expected 
amount of R&D that a company should 
capitalise by estimating model (2) as 
discussed in section 3.2. A company 
would over- (under-) capitalise R&D if the 
amount capitalised is higher (lower) than 
the amount expected to be capitalised. 
The results suggest that companies that 
over-capitalise recognise larger amounts 
(mean RDCap = 0.028 vs. mean RDCap = 
0.009; p<0.01) while the expected amount 
is much smaller (mean RD_expected = 
0.012 vs. mean RD_expected = 0.033; 
p<0.01). Further, relative to the firms that 
under-capitalise R&D, these firms have 
Given that capitalisation 
should signal successful 
R&D projects and thus 
future growth, this 
suggests that over-
capitalisation is likely  
to be a result of 
aggressive reporting. 
4.2 PHASE 2 – R&D-RELATED 
DISCLOSURES IN ANNUAL REPORTS
Table 4.6 presents the mean values of the 
frequency with which each firm makes 
reference to each of the terms in our list 
of keywords across the two sections of 
the annual report (narratives and financial 
statements) and in aggregate. This is 
presented for all the companies in our 
sample as well as separately for 
expensers and capitalisers. 
Overall, although there are some notable 
exceptions, it is apparent that the level of 
R&D disclosure is low. For example, the 
mean (median) frequency of R&D terms in 
an annual report is only 25 (17). Despite 
this low level of disclosure, nonetheless 
the results show that companies tend to 
report more about R&D in the narratives 
sections of the annual report (mean 
(median) frequency of R&D terms being 
15 (9) compared with 9(7) in the financial 
statements). This is not surprising, given 
that IAS 38 does not mandate that any 
narrative disclosures on R&D be provided 
in the financial statements section and 
related footnotes to the accounts. Hence, 
such narrative reporting is more likely to 
be found as part of voluntary disclosure in 
the front end of the report.
Further, we find that capitalisers tend to 
refer more frequently to R&D in their 
annual reports (mean (median) frequency 
of R&D terms being 26 (19) compared 
with 25 (6) in the financial statements; the 
difference in medians is statistically 
significant at the 1% level). It is in the 
financial statements section of the annual 
report that capitalisers appear to report 
significantly more about R&D (mean 
(median) frequency of R&D terms being 
10 (7) compared with 9 (6) in the financial 
statements; the difference in means is 
statistically significant at the 5% level). This 
is equally not surprising. The only specific 
requirement in IAS 38 that expensers must 
disclose the aggregate amount of R&D 
expenditure recognised as an expense 
during the period (IAS 38.126). In contrast, 
a capitaliser is required to provide 
information about each class of intangible 
asset, including capitalised development 
costs, a reconciliation showing movements, 
such as additions, amortisation and so on, 
and the period of amortisation (IAS 38.118). 
The overall level of disclosure was 
debated as part the roundtable 
discussion. It was argued that although 
these levels may appear to be low given 
that the sample comprises R&D active 
firms, such information may be 
communicated via different channels.  
For example, presentations about R&D 
spend are often given to analysts and 
investors during capital market days. 
Hence, where intangibles themselves  
or related disclosures are not visible in 
annual reports, it does not mean that  
they are invisible in general.
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Overall, although there 
are some notable 
exceptions, it is apparent 
that the level of R&D 
disclosure is low. 
Table 4.6: Descriptive statistics of the frequency of R&D terms
PANEL A: FULL SAMPLE
N Mean Median Min Max
FS (only) 3,402 9 7 1 112
Narratives (only) 3,171 15 9 1 230
Annual report 3,039 25 17 2 287
PANEL B CAPITALISERS EXPENSERS
N Mean Median Min Max N Mean Median Min Max
FS (only) 1,295 10 7 1 105 2,107 9 6 1 112
Narratives (only) 1,193 15 9 1 150 1,978 15 8 1 230
Annual report 1,131 26 19 2 211 1,908 25 16 2 287
Definitions and source of all the variables are reported in Appendix I.
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disclosures between the narratives 
section of the annual report and the 
financial statement section. 
Table 4.7 provides information on the 
mean frequency of R&D terms across 
industries. Firms in the Consumer Service 
and Financial industries tend to provide 
the lowest level of disclosures while firms 
in Health Care provide by far the greatest 
quantity of R&D disclosures. This was as 
anticipated by the roundtable discussion, 
given the tendency of these firms to 
expense R&D costs while recognising the 
importance of future product 
development. Further, it is interesting to 
observe that in some industries (such as 
Consumer Service, Financials and 
Technology), there is greater disclosure 
by expensers than by other industries 
such as Consumer Goods, Industrials, and 
Telecoms, where capitalisers report more. 
Figure 4.5 provides a graphical 
representation of the mean value of R&D 
disclosures by each country in our 
sample, excluding the observations for 
the countries also omitted from Figures 
4.1 and 4.3. We note that firms in 
countries such as Canada, Finland, 
France, Germany, Israel and Turkey tend 
to disclose more about R&D than 
companies in the remaining countries in 
our sample. At the other extreme, firms  
in Brazil, Greece, Portugal, and South 
Africa tend to provide the fewest 
disclosures. In addition, firms in countries 
such as Belgium, Greece, and Italy tend 
to disclose more information in the 
financial statement section of the annual 
report than in the narratives section. 
Further, we observe that firms in Australia, 
Brazil, China, Hong Kong, Italy, Malaysia, 
Norway, Portugal, and South Africa  
tend to provide an equal split of 
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We note that firms 
in countries such as 
Canada, Finland, France, 
Germany, Israel and 
Turkey tend to disclose 
more about R&D than 
companies in the 
remaining countries  
in our sample. 
FIGURE 4.5: Graphical representation of the mean frequency of R&D terms by country
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We can interpret these observations as 
follows, when we compare them with 
those in Figure 4.2. It appears that 
companies that follow a treatment which 
is somewhat against the norm for their 
industry, tend to report more R&D-related 
information. For example, for companies 
in the Telecoms and Consumer Goods 
industries the norm is to expense  
(Figure 4.2). In practice, the capitalisers in 
these industries tend to disclose more 
than the expensers (mean R&D terms 24 
and 27 compared with 21 and 18, 
respectively; Table 4.7). The reverse holds, 
albeit more marginally, in industries where 
the norm is to capitalise (ie Consumer 
Service and Technology).17
Figure 4.6 provides a graphical 
representation of the mean frequency of 
R&D terms by industry for our full sample.
The great variation of disclosure between 
industries and the higher levels from the 
Health Care firms were also noted in the 
ACCA roundtable discussion. This clearly 
highlights the prevalence of industry 
effects in relation to both capitalisation of 
R&D and the levels of disclosure provided 
to stakeholders. The materiality of research 
for future product (drug development) 
pipelines is significant across that sector as 
is the importance of associated research 
activity disclosures. In fact, the level of 
disclosures provided by expensers, as can 
be seen from the Table 4.7, typifies the 
pharmaceutical sector within Health Care. 
In contrast to this, the disclosures 
provided by firms from the Financials and 
Consumer Service industries are relatively 
low in quantity. The level of disclosure 
and its usefulness is more fully considered 
in Phase 3 of the research.
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It appears that 
companies that follow 
a treatment which is 
somewhat against the 
norm for their industry, 
tend to report more 
R&D-related information. 
TABLE 4.7: Mean frequency of R&D terms by industry
FULL SAMPLE EXPENSERS CAPITALISERS
Narratives
(only)
FS
(only)
Annual 
report
Narratives
(only)
FS
(only)
Annual 
report
Narratives
(only)
FS
(only)
Annual 
report
Basic Materials 14 7 21 14 6 21 12 8 22
Consumer Goods 13 7 21 11 6 18 19 9 27
Consumer Service 6 7 13 8 6 15 4 8 11
Financials 8 6 14 11 6 16 5 6 10
Health Care 28 17 46 32 19 51 22 14 37
Industrials 13 8 22 11 7 18 17 9 26
Technology 14 10 25 15 11 26 13 10 23
Telecommunication 12 11 22 12 10 21 11 14 24
Utilities 16 8 25 17 7 25 13 9 25
FIGURE 4.6: Graphical representation of the mean value of R&D disclosures by industry
Basic materials
Consumer goods
Consumer services
Financials
Health care
Technology
Telecommunications
Utilities
Industrials
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
  Narratives (only)          FS (only)          Annual report
17 Appendix V provides detailed information (min, max, mean, median) between expensers and capitalisers across industries.
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Appendix VI identifies a selection of 
companies from across the world for 
which the R&D intensity levels and the 
level of R&D disclosure in their annual 
reports vary significantly. The relevant 
information about frequency of 
disclosures is disaggregated across 
sections of their annual reports.  
In relation to key disclosure items, Table 
4.9 provides a summary of the most and 
least popular terms from the R&D 
keywords we used in our analysis (see 
section 3.4). As expected, companies 
tend to refer commonly to terms such as 
‘research and development’ (and ‘R&D’) 
and five of the most common keywords 
featuring in IAS 38. Firms also tend to 
make reference to ‘product’, ‘software’, 
‘research’, ‘clinical’ and ‘technology 
development’. Interestingly, the list of 
least common terms includes six of the  
19 terms we include in the dictionary  
and that relate to patents.
Table 4.8 presents the mean and median 
of disclosure quantity and R&D intensity 
for each quartile of R&D disclosure in the 
annual report as a whole. Consistent with 
the information discussed above, we 
observe significant differences in the 
disclosure quantity in the annual report 
between the quartiles. For instance, the 
median disclosure quantity in the annual 
report for the bottom quartile is 7 for 
both expensers and capitalisers, while the 
median disclosure quantity on the top 
portfolio is 50 and 46 for expensers and 
capitalisers respectively. Further, we 
observe that R&D intensity increases 
monotonically from the bottom to the top 
quartile of R&D disclosure. It is only for 
the top quartile that there are notable 
differences between expensers and 
capitalisers, arguably driven by the  
Health Care constituents, which are  
the most prevalent reporters and, in  
fact, are those that tend to expense  
R&D costs. Taken together, these  
results reflect the significance of R&D  
investment in determining the level of 
R&D-related disclosures.
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Consistent with the 
information discussed 
above, we observe 
significant differences in 
the disclosure quantity 
in the annual report 
between the quartiles.
TABLE 4.8: Frequency of R&D-related terms across expensers and capitalisers and R&D intensity levels, based on quartiles of 
disclosure levels in the annual report 
FS (ONLY) NARRATIVES (ONLY) ANNUAL REPORT R&D INTENSITY
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
PANEL A: TOP QUARTILE
Capitalisers 19 16 35 31 54 46 0.076 0.043
Expensers 20 16 42 31 62 50 0.106 0.044
PANEL B: 2nd QUARTILE
Capitalisers 10 10 14 13 24 23 0.068 0.031
Expensers 10 9 14 14 23 23 0.061 0.020
PANEL C: 3rd QUARTILE
Capitalisers 7 6 7 7 14 14 0.056 0.022
Expensers 6 6 7 6 14 13 0.035 0.008
PANEL D: 4th QUARTILE
Capitalisers 3 3 3 2 7 7 0.036 0.008
Expensers 3 3 3 3 7 7 0.021 0.003
Finally, Table 4.10 shows the determinants 
of disclosure quantity. The table provides 
six models of multivariate analysis with the 
dependent variable being the disclosure 
quantity in the annual report (Models 1 and 
2), in the narratives section of the annual 
report (Models 3 and 4) and the financial 
statements (Models 5 and 6). The models 
are presented twice, using alternative 
measures to proxy for incentives to 
manipulate earnings by means of 
capitalising R&D. Specifically, Models 2,  
4 and 6 employ PastBeat and ZeroBeat 
while Models 1, 3 and 5 use BenchBeat, 
which combines PastBeat and ZeroBeat. 
While industry has a clear effect, as shown 
in Figure 4.6 and Table 4.7, this was 
treated as a fixed-effect control variable. 
According to Table 4.9, capitalisation (CAP) 
is not associated with greater disclosures 
about R&D, confirming our univariate 
results. It also reflects the finding that for 
half of the industries it is the capitalisers 
that disclose more and for the other half 
is the expensers (Table 4.7). Further, size 
(Size) has a positive coefficient, statistically 
significant across all models. This is in line 
with prior disclosure literature, which 
shows that larger firms tend to disclose 
more than comparator smaller firms owing 
to increased regulatory scrutiny and 
visibility. Similarly, R&D intensity (RDInt) has 
a positive coefficient, statistically significant 
across all models. This finding is consistent 
with prior literature (eg Entwistle 1999; 
Merkley 2014) and suggests that the 
materiality of R&D results in greater R&D 
disclosure. This is also reflected in the 
examples shown in Appendix VI and is 
consistent with the information reported in 
Table 4.8. Moreover, firms with higher risk 
(Beta) and greater international exposure 
(IntSalesPerc) also tend to disclose more 
about R&D. Additionally, the variables 
capturing earnings management incentives 
(BenchBeat, PastBeat and ZeroBeat) are all 
positive and statistically significant, which 
suggests that firms with strong incentives 
to manage earnings may engage in a 
window-dressing type of disclosure. 
Interestingly, we find that older firms tend 
to mention less about R&D, as indicated 
by the negative and significant coefficient 
of Age in all six models. Considering that 
larger firms tend to perform more basic 
research or maintenance and upgrades to 
their products (eg Cazavan-Jeny et al. 
2011; Oswald 2008) this finding may not be 
surprising. Further, Table 4.10 shows that 
the coefficient of Corruption is positive 
and significant, which suggests that firms 
operating in more corrupted countries 
tend to disclose more about R&D. Given 
the evidence in prior literature (eg Mazzi et 
al. 2018) that firms in countries with higher 
levels of corruption tend to engage in 
more aggressive capitalisation, the finding 
of increased disclosures in such settings is 
indicative of attempts to obfuscate 
performance and thus engage in a 
window-dressing type of disclosure. Finally, 
firms operating in civil law legal systems 
also tend to provide more disclosures 
about R&D, as indicated by the positive 
and significant coefficient of CivCom.
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According to Table 4.9, 
capitalisation (CAP) is 
not associated with 
greater disclosures about 
R&D, confirming our 
univariate results.
TABLE 4.9: Most and least popular terms identified  
MOST COMMON R&D TERMS IDENTIFIED* LEAST COMMON R&D TERMS IDENTIFIED
Research and development Applied for patent
R&D Awarded patents
Product development Claims in this patent
Internally generated Completion of key milestones
New technologies Developing new process
Software development Established a collaboration
New technology Patent was awarded
Clinical trial Patents received
Technical feasibility Planned trial
Clinical development Possible alliance
Ability to use Received patents
Development phase Research and evaluation project
Research development Research engineering and development
Clinical studies
Technology development
*Keywords in red have been identified from IAS 38
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TABLE 4.10: Determinants of disclosure frequency of R&D terms
ANNUAL REPORT NARRATIVES (ONLY) FS (ONLY)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
CAP 0.024
(0.61)
0.021
(0.55)
–0.007
(–0.16)
–0.012
(–0.26)
0.015
(0.40)
0.014
(0.38)
BM –0.054**
(–2.36)
–0.058**
(–2.55)
–0.053**
(–2.06)
–0.058**
(–2.29)
–0.032
(–1.60)
–0.035*
(–1.76)
RDValue –0.000***
(–7.17)
–0.000***
(–7.26)
–0.000***
(–6.06)
–0.000***
(–6.15)
–0.000***
(–4.37)
–0.000***
(–4.47)
RDInt 1.882***
(9.27)
1.848***
(8.98)
2.005***
(9.06)
1.941***
(8.65)
1.740***
(9.02)
1.724***
(8.90)
Size 0.072***
(8.34)
0.073***
(8.29)
0.093***
(9.38)
0.093***
(9.35)
0.030***
(3.45)
0.030***
(3.48)
Beta 0.058***
(4.18)
0.058***
(4.24)
0.054***
(3.42)
0.056***
(3.51)
0.046***
(3.61)
0.047***
(3.65)
Leverage –0.011
(–0.68)
–0.011
(–0.66)
–0.010
(–0.54)
–0.010
(–0.56)
0.004
(0.24)
0.004
(0.25)
IntSalesPerc 0.002***
(3.12)
0.001***
(3.10)
0.002***
(3.19)
0.002***
(3.17)
0.001**
(2.28)
0.001**
(2.28)
BenchBeat 0.262***
(8.07)
0.304***
(7.67)
0.209***
(6.81)
ZeroBeat 0.177***
(3.47)
0.225***
(3.87)
0.154***
(3.21)
PastBeat 0.221***
(6.37)
0.263***
(6.24)
0.153***
(4.61)
Age –0.063***
(–2.84)
–0.063***
(–2.86)
–0.055**
(–2.20)
–0.056**
(–2.24)
–0.062***
(–2.94)
–0.062***
(–2.95)
AudEnf –0.002
(–0.68)
–0.002
(–0.65)
–0.001
(–0.28)
–0.001
(–0.23)
–0.003
(–0.94)
–0.003
(–0.90)
InvProtection 0.052
(1.51)
0.053
(1.52)
0.114***
(2.88)
0.115***
(2.90)
0.006
(0.17)
0.006
(0.16)
AntiselfDeal 0.010
(0.06)
0.007
(0.04)
–0.333
(–1.63)
–0.336
(–1.64)
0.436**
(2.52)
0.435**
(2.49)
CivCom 0.465***
(4.07)
0.465***
(4.06)
0.462***
(3.57)
0.464***
(3.59)
0.442***
(4.12)
0.442***
(4.10)
Corruption 0.832***
(4.68)
0.813***
(4.47)
0.922***
(4.55)
0.903***
(4.43)
0.504***
(2.81)
0.496***
(2.73)
Baloftrade –0.005*
(–1.85)
–0.005*
(–1.85)
–0.005*
(–1.88)
–0.005*
(–1.86)
–0.005*
(–1.76)
–0.005*
(–1.76)
DitriInfra 0.029
(0.88)
0.030
(0.90)
0.083**
(2.23)
0.083**
(2.22)
–0.047
(–1.46)
–0.046
(–1.44)
EnerInfra –0.042
(–1.56)
–0.042
(–1.56)
–0.082***
(–2.61)
–0.082***
(–2.60)
0.003
(0.12)
0.002
(0.10)
HeatlhInfra 0.033
(1.19)
0.032
(1.16)
0.046
(1.55)
0.045
(1.51)
0.030
(1.06)
0.030
(1.06)
SkilledLabour –0.015
(–0.58)
–0.014
(–0.55)
–0.021
(–0.70)
–0.020
(–0.66)
0.004
(0.17)
0.004
(0.19)
Constant 0.347
(0.97)
0.366
(1.02)
–0.904**
(–2.23)
–0.888**
(–2.18)
0.510
(1.43)
0.515
(1.43)
Observations
F
r2_a
3,039
26.602
0.332
3,039
25.653
0.330
3171
27.984
0.307
3171
26.974
0.307
3402
14.688
0.234
3402
13.754
0.231
t statistics in parentheses. Industry and year fixed effects included but not shown. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Definitions and source of all the variables are reported in Appendix I. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
In the results for Phase 3, as reported 
below, the interviews consider the 
decision-usefulness of R&D disclosure to 
stakeholders. They also capture the 
tension between decision-usefulness and 
proprietary information. 
4.3 PHASE 3 – R&D ACCOUNTING AND 
REPORTING: STAKEHOLDERS’ VIEWS
Consistent with the project’s research 
aims and the participant overview 
provided in advance of all interviews, the 
key qualitative findings are now reported 
in three sub-sections. These reflect the 
three central themes on which prior 
literature has concentrated, as discussed 
in Chapter 2. 
Accounting treatment of R&D 
expenditure
Before reflecting on the signalling effect 
or irrelevance (the no-effects hypothesis) 
of accounting for R&D expenditure, and 
specifically on capitalisation, there was 
general agreement across all three 
stakeholder groups as to the need for IAS 
38 to address R&D accounting by 
following a principles-based framework. 
This is in contrast to the US approach of 
expensing all R&D expenditure. There 
was general appreciation that intangible 
assets should be adequately captured on 
the balance sheet (statement of financial 
position) if the conditions in the standard 
were met. The following direct quotes 
reflect this general view. 
‘Does it [expensing all] get me closer to 
the nirvana where I’d like accounting to 
get us to? No, I don’t think it does…. if 
you continue to expense R&D, that gap 
between market capitalisation and net 
asset value is just going to continue to 
grow and grow’. (A1) 
‘Accounting principles has [sic] a 
framework that expenses will be matched 
with their earnings such that the principle 
under capitalisation matches expense to 
future defined economic benefits: to not 
do so would substantially decrease the 
comparative usefulness [of accounting 
information]’. (P2)
‘It’s important to have the standard to 
give a basis for capitalisation instead 
of just expensing. How the actual 
accounting is then used by stakeholders is 
a different matter’. (I4)
While there was support for a principles-
based standard with capitalisation, R&D 
accounting was nonetheless, in general, 
dismissed as irrelevant by all the 
investors. They focused much more on 
the overall cash spend on R&D than on its 
accounting. This is consistent to the 
‘no-effects hypothesis’ (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986) and the findings of 
Goodacre and McGrath (1997) in their 
experimental study. For instance, 
interviewee I5 reflected that, ‘while the 
story of the overall R&D process is 
important to us, we need to tie that into 
overall R&D spend’. More specifically, I2 
remarked, ‘we look at each company, 
what it spends on R&D….we look at all 
these companies on a cash flow basis’ 
and I6 bluntly noted that, ‘from an 
investor perspective, cash spend and free 
cash flows are way more important than 
R&D accounting’. 
Interestingly, the general investor view of 
accounting irrelevance was also recognised 
by some of the preparers and auditors: 
‘Investors are not really interested in the 
accounting treatment – in fact some retail 
investors may be misled by capitalisation. 
They look at cash spend’. (P2)
 ‘I think they [capital markets] care 
about what the R&D number is and what 
programme it’s being spent on….but , I 
think [on] the accounting side of it, I don’t 
think the markets care less to be honest’. 
(A5)
Nonetheless, there was some support for 
signalling (Ahmed and Falk 2006; Shah et 
al. 2013) from one of the investors, who 
asserted that capitalisation is: ‘showing 
the management’s confidence in the 
asset, if they are willing to capitalise it. 
So, I think there’s some informational 
quality in that sense... and there are 
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While there was 
support for a principles-
based standard with 
capitalisation, R&D 
accounting was 
nonetheless, in general, 
dismissed as irrelevant 
by all the investors.
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R&D, for you to have done that it has to 
have yield… you’re expecting future 
benefits....it’s still shareholders’ monies 
that are being spent’. More bluntly, I6 
commented that ‘all R&D spend may 
ultimately lead to an increase in future 
earnings, but which projects will come 
through is guesswork: otherwise, if it was 
known to fail, the spend would not be 
done!’. Further, one of the auditors (A2) 
reflected, ‘historically, the correlation 
between R&D spend and R&D success is 
rather weak’. 
Concern was also raised about the 
difficulty of meeting the conditions for 
recognising an intangible asset and 
having the information audited, which 
creates a potential preference towards 
expensing. This is certainly the case in 
industries such as pharmaceuticals, where 
capitalisation is largely restricted to that 
period after regulatory approval. As two 
of the participants noted ‘92% of every 
drug in development fails’ (I3) and ‘once 
we’ve passed that we start capitalising 
except for the fact there’s hardly anything 
left to capitalise’ (A2). Thus capitalisation, 
certainly in some sectors – and especially 
pharmaceuticals within Health Care – is 
largely redundant. 
Such concerns over meeting the 
conditions necessary for the capitalisation 
of internally funded R&D projects were 
also highlighted by both auditors and 
preparers who contrasted this accounting 
treatment with that in relation to 
externally purchased development costs 
under IFRS 3. From a preparer 
perspective, P2 commented specifically 
on the 'inconsistency between standards, 
I think, there is something to improve….
you’ve got IFRS 3, so if I’ve got in-process 
research and development then I have to 
recognise it as an intangible because I 
bought it. But I certainly wouldn’t be 
encouraging IAS 38 to move to put some 
of those intangibles you recognise under 
IFRS 3, like customer lists or customer 
relationships, onto your own balance 
sheet.' Thus, there is a clear tension 
between the accounting for intangibles 
with respect to externally purchased versus 
internally generated development costs. 
hidden signals in terms of financial 
reporting’ (I3). Further, there was some, 
albeit mild, support of a signalling effect 
from the preparers and auditors as 
regards their perspective of investor 
market use. But in such cases it was 
largely muted by the dominance of cash 
spend. For instance, A2 commented that 
‘capitalisation may send a positive signal 
to the market but largely in line with 
market expectations.’ But he/she 
continues that ‘the market is probably 
more interested in overall spend than 
necessarily [in] accounting’. Further, while 
one of the preparers recognised 
signalling, he/she nonetheless argued 
that it was outweighed by the emphasis 
on cash spend, ‘I think the market is 
interested; from our perspective the 
market’s interested in the fact that we do 
capitalise in the sense of that you’ve 
identified something that you think’s 
going to generate future cash flows…but 
what’s more important from a cash 
perspective [is that] I’m still spending the 
cash, so it’s your view on what the P&L 
should reflect’ (P4). Interestingly, the 
importance of cash spend had also been 
expressed by a representative of the 
investment community during the 
roundtable discussion.
Most of the investors accepted the 
expenses/capitalisation accounting in the 
audited financial statements and had 
confidence in those. Ultimately, as 
discussed, they focus more on cash 
spend and its integration into the 
underpinning strategy and business 
model. Indeed, from a user perspective, 
A6 commented that: ‘What is important: 
it’s the story to stakeholders. So, it would 
include the business model and how well 
the development capitalisation fitted with 
the business model and how well the 
development actually fitted within the 
overall story of the strategic report.’ 
All the investors held that the relationship 
between accounting and future earnings 
is extremely difficult to match and to 
some extent not worth pursuing, which 
contributes to the irrelevance of 
accounting. Thus, for instance, I1 
comments that ‘every dollar spent on 
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Concern was also raised 
about the difficulty of 
meeting the conditions 
for recognising an 
intangible asset and 
having the information 
audited, which creates 
a natural preference 
towards expensing.
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resources of the acquired business are 
regarded as externally purchased' (p. 1). 
A similar outcome of the diverse 
accounting treatment is also noted by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2008, p. 22) 
who asserted in the case of an acquisition 
that 'assets and liabilities will be measured 
at fair value, including intangible assets 
and contingent liabilities. The revised 
standard continues the requirement for 
identification of intangible assets, with 
very few intangibles being excluded from 
identification and valuation'. 
Expensing and prudence
All the interview participants emphasised 
the prevalence of expensing over 
capitalisation. This related to three main 
and interrelated aspects: accounting 
conservatism and prudence; the difficulty 
of meeting or assuring the six conditions to 
be met prior to mandatory capitalisation; 
and concerns about future impairment. 
Firstly, regarding prudence, an interesting 
tension emerged between prudence and 
a bias to expensing, in contrast to faithful 
representation through the recognition of 
intangible assets on the balance sheet. 
This was encapsulated by interviewee  
A5 as follows: ‘expensing is more 
commonplace, but faithful representation 
might say ‘but there could be an asset 
here and to faithfully represent that 
there’s an argument for capitalisation’.  
So, there a tension between the two, 
yes… and you’re going to start from a 
more conservative platform’. Indeed, for 
many of the auditors and preparers, 
expensing simply ‘makes life so much 
easier in the old-fashioned way of 
prudence’ (A3). Thus, while prudence was 
not part of the Conceptual Framework 
between 2010 and 2018, the vestiges of a 
prudent approach apparently remain in 
practice. Indeed, the underpinning 
literature points to a long history of 
prudence in the treatment of R&D 
accounting, beginning before IFRS 
adoption (Billiot and Glandon 2005; 
Entwistle 1999; Lev et al. 2005; Nixon 
1997; Stark 2008). Such a potential 
‘nervousness’ towards capitalisation by 
auditors was also remarked upon during 
the earlier roundtable discussion.
Such a tension between the standards 
was also highlighted by the auditor 
group. For instance, A4 noted, 'in the 
case of an acquisition you would have to 
actually value that development work and 
that would be done more on a market 
valuation as to what you could realise that 
development cost capitalisation for which 
is misaligned with IAS 38'. They 
continued: 'there is an issue with different 
forms of capitalisation and different 
justifications where you have acquired 
capitalised based on an ascribed value 
and you have internal costs capitalised on 
a cost model. I think that is an issue'. 
Similarly, A1 bluntly remarked: 'does that 
make a lot of sense actually?'. The 
interviewee highlighted that 'I think is an 
odd outcome of accounting if you think 
about business combination, so the IFRS3 
will [recognise that] you’ve got a Phase 1 
asset [and thus] I am going to place a 
value on that on my books, no matter 
how early stage it is'. Clearly this brings 
into sharp contrast the differential 
accounting treatment. 
The contrast between the two standards 
was also discussed in the round table 
meeting. In general, as with the 
interviews, there was concern as to the 
apparent inconsistency of accounting 
between the standards. This was 
summarised by one of the participants, 
'inconsistency is a real problem, two 
companies generating identical stream of 
cash flows but different earnings profiles 
based on whether they acquire R&D or 
do it internally'. The round table also 
raised concerns as to whether this would 
have any impact or distortion on capital 
markets and ascribing business value due 
to the differences in accounting for 
externally purchased versus internally 
generated assets. This concern is also 
echoed in practice. For instance, Grant 
Thornton (2013, p1) report: 'in fact, the 
acquired entity may have been subject to 
specific restrictions in International 
Accounting Standard 38 ‘Intangible 
Assets’ (IAS 38) that prohibit the 
recognition of many internally generated 
intangible assets (IAS 38.51-53). These 
restrictions do not apply to business 
combination accounting – in effect, all 
The contrast between 
IFRS 3 and IAS 38 was 
also discussed in the 
round table meeting. 
In general, as with 
the interviews, there 
was concern as to the 
apparent inconsistency 
of accounting between 
the standards. 
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One common element of robustness was 
any history of impairment (Ciftci 2010; 
Entwistle 1999). In contrast to the 
capitalisation decision, impairment is 
considered to send stronger negative 
signals to the market about reduced 
earnings and confidence in management 
and material judgement. Externalities 
were accepted by investors but a trend of 
impairment would erode this. Recognising 
the adverse impact of impairment, P3 
commented: ‘we would be concerned with 
any future impairment and the negative 
signal that sends about the company and 
about our judgments; hence we would 
adopt a conservative approach to 
accounting’. These concerns about future 
earnings and managerial confidence were 
reflected in an auditor’s opinion: ‘I think 
that awareness of a double hit tends to 
make CFOs [chief financial officers] wary 
of capitalisation’ (A5). Finally, from an 
investor perspective, ‘a big impairment is 
a strong negative, unless there’s a good 
external reason but even then, perhaps 
expensing should have been applied in 
the first place. Future earnings are hit 
and….what [does] that tell me about 
managerial judgement?’ (I5).
In the discussions on capitalisation, there 
was some, albeit limited, recognition of 
the potential for earnings management 
(Markarian et al. 2008) and this elicited 
some sympathy for the US approach to 
expensing. A2 cynically commented, 
however, that such an approach – in 
contrast to any principles-based standard 
on capitalisation – was ‘the easy way out’. 
As discussed, most of the investors 
accepted the audited financial statements 
as presented and from that ran their own 
models. In contrast, a minority adopted 
an extreme position of 100% 
recapitalisation. Indeed, in discussing the 
possible managerial subjectivity of IAS 38 
with respect to the capitalisation 
conditions, one interviewee from the 
investors’ group explained that their 
treatment was to capitalise all R&D costs. 
Thus, I1 explained, ‘We have our own 
equity valuation model, we capitalise all 
R&D... any written-off research we’re 
going to recapitalise that…We want to 
take the subjectivity out of IAS 38 so it 
removes that and then it removes, 
obviously, the accounting distortions’. 
Secondly, while recognising the principle 
and importance of conditionality behind 
capitalisation, there were strongly held 
views on the difficulties of meeting (by 
preparers) and assuring (by auditors) the 
six conditions specified in IAS 38 prior to 
capitalisation. Such a finding is consistent 
to that reported in the literature (for 
instance Zéghal and Maaloul, 2011). For 
example, interviewee P4 stated that ‘the 
six conditions effectively lead to 
expensing especially mainly due to 
technical feasibility and future market, 
which are often inherently unknown and 
thus [there is] no certainty to support 
capitalisation or for auditor assurance’. 
Indeed, recognising the inherent 
difficulties of assurance, one of the 
auditors commented, ‘I imagine that 
many auditors sigh a huge sigh of relief 
when they see that a client has decided 
to expense all of the development costs 
because it takes away a lot of that 
judgement, takes away a lot of the need 
to try and audit something which is 
inherently very difficult to audit’ (A1). In 
some industries, notably pharmaceuticals, 
this made capitalisation virtually non-
existent, ‘I know it is completely common 
practice in the pharmaceutical industry 
that pretty much nothing gets capitalised 
until you have regulatory approval’ (A3). 
The concern over the six conditions and 
auditor assurance, especially with regard 
to future markets, was a commonly raised 
issue, although all the preparers had 
experience of capitalisation and 
confirmed that they had internal 
management and governance systems to 
help identify appropriate capitalisation. 
These systems served as a helpful basis 
for assurance as well as acting as a track 
record of successful projects, in contrast 
to a history of impairment, which would 
call managerial judgement into question. 
The dynamic of the preparer/auditor 
relationship can be illustrated by the 
comment: ‘I think it’s understanding how 
management has made its judgement…
and then from an audit perspective it is 
challenging it...it’s more about 
management having a robust process  
to have challenged themselves and to 
have considered the alternative outcomes 
and the potential impact of the 
alternative outcomes’ (A3).  
In contrast to the 
capitalisation decision, 
impairment is considered 
to send stronger 
negative signals to the 
market about reduced 
earnings and confidence 
in management and 
material judgement.
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Unsurprisingly, the tension that surfaced 
reflected concerns about making 
increased disclosures to support decision 
usefulness versus the need to safeguard 
proprietary information and commercial 
sensitivity. This principally focused on how 
the capitalisation conditions were met 
and associated managerial judgements, 
along with the granularity of the R&D split 
by material product groups. For instance, 
interviewee A3 reflected: ‘I think there is 
management always trying to balance 
what it believes to be market-sensitive, 
proprietary, whatever, against the need to 
provide useful information from a 
usefulness perspective’. Indeed, P1 
admitted ‘basically, the disclosure is quite 
limited…I think it would be a good idea 
to have some specific disclosures on 
capitalisation’. This tension in part reflects 
the debate in the literature between 
those who argue that disclosure 
(mandatory and voluntary) does satisfy 
the needs of users (Merkley 2014; 
Penman 2009) and those who advocate 
greater levels of reporting (Lev 2018a). 
From a user perspective, there was 
demand for greater, more focused, 
disclosure balanced against the 
voluminous nature of corporate reporting. 
Investors lamented that, ‘the level of 
disclosure, the transparency, is so 
opaque’ (I3) and ‘we never get that level 
of disclosure beyond the aggregate cost 
of R&D’ (I2). Thus, the disclosure is often 
at an aggregate level although investors 
did recognise the usefulness of quality 
narrative disclosure and the strategic 
review in relation to R&D. 
‘Quality narrative disclosure may 
provide an appropriate way forward 
and avoid the more proprietary detailed 
financial disclosures’. (A5)
‘I think it’s the tone from that that may 
or may not come across… they actually 
have control over what goes into those 
first few pages, so it’s very interesting 
from my perspective…what the overall 
tone is and what they are not talking 
about….it’s tone and exclusion that’s 
useful’. (I6)
The general issue of earnings 
management was recognised by 
preparers and auditors. This again led 
auditors to be more conservative (or 
prudent) in their approach to and 
assurance of capitalisation, especially in a 
regulated environment with high levels of 
audit-file review. From a preparer 
perspective, the opportunity for earnings 
management was more fully recognised 
in relation to a less visible regulatory 
perspective and to private businesses, 
‘The criteria are judgemental as the 
principles are laid out. They’re not rules, 
they are principles. So, yes, if you were 
minded to want to try and achieve a 
particular outcome then I think IAS 38 
does give you some leeway to do so. So, 
in that context you could take the view of 
debits to the balance sheet’ (P4). This 
would accord with managerial 
manipulation, as noted by Cazavan-Jeny 
et al. (2011) and Dinh et al. (2015). In a 
reverse situation, interviewee A5 noted: 
‘in smaller companies, maybe coming to 
an IPO, then you would need to be 
mindful of over-expensing so as to have 
future abnormal earnings effectively in 
hand’. Thus, earnings management was 
appreciated in the contexts of both 
increasing and decreasing earnings. 
Disclosure
The final aspect of all the interviews 
related to disclosure. While IAS 38 sets 
out the six conditions to be met for 
capitalisation of development costs, the 
mandatory disclosure requirements in 
relation to those criteria are minimal, 
beyond the accounting for R&D and the 
split between expensed and capitalised 
costs usually dealt with through a 
boiler-plated accounting policy note. 
Although there is a requirement to 
present a reconciliation for each class of 
intangible asset there is (beyond IAS 1 on 
material managerial judgements) very 
little by way of mandatory requirements 
for R&D capitalisation, with disclosure 
being largely voluntary in the front-end of 
the annual report. 
Unsurprisingly, the 
tension that surfaced 
reflected concerns 
about making increased 
disclosures to support 
decision usefulness 
versus the need to 
safeguard proprietary 
information and 
commercial sensitivity. 
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Indeed, this issue was widely appreciated 
across the auditor group and the 
recognition that there may well follow 
greater regulatory pressure on the quality 
of disclosures required under IAS 1 in 
relation to significant managerial 
judgements, such as would be the case in 
a significant and material capitalisation. 
This was summed up by A3: ‘I think 
properly applied, the guidance in IAS 1 
would address any concerns’. 
Overall, there is recognition of the need 
for a standard and its principles-based 
application. The level of expensing 
relative to capitalisation is a product of 
the standard and the demonstration and 
assurance of the six conditions, coupled 
with accounting conservatism or 
prudence. This latter issue is further 
exacerbated by concerns over 
impairment. Disclosure remains a 
contested area between the need for 
decision-usefulness and the desire to 
protect proprietary information, although 
issues were evident over the interface 
between IAS 38 and IAS 1 and the level 
and quality of disclosure about significant 
managerial judgements such as that 
associated with a material capitalisation. 
The question of managerial judgements 
and related disclosures was referred to by 
preparers and auditors, as well as the link 
to IAS 1. IAS 1, paragraph 125 stipulates, 
‘An entity shall disclose information about 
the assumptions it makes about the 
future, and other major sources of 
estimation uncertainty at the end of the 
reporting period, that have a significant risk 
of resulting in a material adjustment to the 
carrying amounts of assets and liabilities 
within the next financial year’ (emphasis 
added). Despite this, A1 reflected: 
‘This actually ties in with an area of 
the accounts that I think is historically 
been done very, very poorly to date, which 
is IAS 1 disclosures around judgements 
and estimates. Because if it is a key 
judgement or a key source of estimation 
uncertainty [as to whether] … I [should] 
have capitalised more of it, and actually 
that’s a key judgement, then there should 
be sufficient disclosures as a result of IAS 
1 for a user to understand the judgements 
that management have taken’. (A1)
The level of expensing 
relative to capitalisation 
is a product of the 
standard and the 
demonstration and 
assurance of the six 
conditions, coupled with 
accounting conservatism 
or prudence. 
47
5.1 CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS
The issue of intangible assets and R&D in 
particular has been high on the agenda of 
standard setters and regulators (eg ESMA 
(Maijoor 2015), FASB (2017), FRC (2018) 
and EFRAG, 2018). There is also concern as 
to whether intangible assets are reflected 
in companies’ financial statements, given 
the current accounting standards and that 
the gap between book and market values 
is widening over time owing to the 
increasing importance of intangibles. 
Further, concern was expressed as to the 
apparent inconsistency of accounting 
treatment between externally purchased 
(under IAS 3) and internally generated R&D 
and the capitalisation conditions specified 
in IAS 38. On that basis, it is expected 
that the following conclusions and 
recommendations arising from our research 
findings would inform these projects, 
along with the related academic literature. 
Our findings suggest that more than 60% 
of the companies in our sample do not 
capitalise R&D. Additionally, we find that 
a large proportion of the companies that 
capitalise some development costs would 
be expected not to do so, given their 
firm- and country-specific characteristics. 
Overall, while maintaining the principles-
based approach that supports 
5. Conclusion
capitalisation, it would appear that 
current criteria in IAS 38 actually militate 
against capitalisation. Relaxing the 
criteria for capitalisation by reducing their 
number could be the way forward. Lev 
(2018a) argues that such 
recommendations would help restore the 
value-relevance of financial information 
by improving revenue-cost matching in 
the income statement by capitalising and 
amortising expense on value-creating 
assets such as R&D (and see Ohlson 
2006). This could also result in giving 
companies less room for exercising 
earnings management and would 
improve auditors’ ability to assure any 
capitalised amounts. Perhaps professional 
accountancy bodies can assist indirectly 
in the improvement of companies’ 
practices. Providing more in-depth 
training on the area of R&D and the 
issues around it could assist in a change 
of culture towards recognising the 
balance or tension between prudence 
and the faithful representation of assets. 
Additionally, preparers and auditors could 
be encouraged to support more 
disclosure to promote transparency.
We find that discussion of R&D is minimal 
in companies’ annual reports. Moreover, 
disclosures vary significantly in both 
length and location in the annual report. 
The interviews with stakeholders also 
confirm a clear demand for more 
disclosure, especially when development 
costs are capitalised. Thus, as a first step 
forward, companies are encouraged to 
provide clearer and more disclosures 
about the amounts of R&D expenditure 
recognised in their financial statements. 
As far as the standard setters are 
concerned, if disclosures continue not to 
be mandated in IAS 38, a better link 
between R&D-related information and 
the disclosures required in IAS 1 about 
estimation risks and future prospects 
could be introduced. Moreover, given 
that the market recognises the 
importance of the overall R&D spend 
rather than how it is accounted for, 
enhanced disclosure of that overall 
amount of R&D spend is deemed 
appropriate to aid the decision-
usefulness of financial statements (in 
either the notes to the financial 
statements or the narratives section of 
the annual report). Further to these issues 
of direct relevance to IAS 38, is the 
tension between standards reflecting an 
apparent inconsistency of accounting 
treatment. Under IAS 38, there are 
stringent conditions for the capitalisation 
of development costs and their 
recognition as intangible assets on the 
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5.2 LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS 
FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The results reported above are subject to 
a number of common limitations and 
caveats. First, for Phases 1 and 2 our 
samples are based on firm-level data 
revealed by commercial databases. These 
may contain errors and misclassifications. 
Second, certain firms may engage in R&D 
but may not report any R&D expense in 
the income statement or any R&D asset 
on the balance sheet. These companies 
are not included in the sample. In practice, 
their inclusion is unlikely to affect our 
results because these firms have low R&D 
intensity. Third, we rely on econometric 
techniques to identify the expected 
amounts of R&D a company should 
capitalise. While we have made every 
effort to develop a model that accurately 
predicts the expected accounting 
treatment of R&D, we recognise that this 
may misclassify some companies. 
For Phase 3, we acknowledge that the 
views expressed in this research relate 
only to the sample of our interviewees. 
Nonetheless, given the common issues 
that were identified in the discussion, we 
tentatively consider them to be broadly 
representative of the respective groups 
(see Bence et al. 1995; Campbell and 
Slack 2011). 
Future research could examine R&D-
related disclosures made in conference 
calls and/or non-regulated methods of 
communications (voluntary disclosures). 
Moreover, future research could examine 
whether disclosures and recognition  
are considered to be complements  
or substitutes. Future research could  
also examine the recognition of and 
disclosures about other intangibles that 
could be capitalised under IAS 38. This 
point is further reinforced by the general 
lack of research on intangibles other  
than goodwill and R&D. 
balance sheet. In contrast, under IFRS 3, 
for purchased R&D costs, such costs can 
be capitalised and hence result in more 
intangible assets being recognised on the 
balance sheet for an acquiring firm 
compared to an identical firm that has 
internally generated R&D projects. Thus, 
consideration should be given to this 
inconsistency or to further extend 
disclosure requirements to more explicitly 
discuss the reasons justifying the 
capitalisation of the acquired 
development costs on acquisition.    
We find that the quantity of R&D-related 
disclosure from companies in countries 
such as Italy, which explicitly requires 
companies to discuss R&D-related 
matters in the Management Discussion 
and Analysis section of annual reports, 
exceeds significantly that made by 
companies in countries that lack such a 
requirement. Hence, the revised 
Management Commentary or revised 
corporate governance policies at the 
country level could require a specific 
section on R&D, where relevant. 
Finally, it is noted that we find significant 
differences in  decisions about 
capitalising development costs, the 
amounts capitalised, and the quantity of 
R&D-related terms, between countries. 
Thus, any changes in related regulations/
standards that will be applicable to a 
variety of countries will be unlikely to 
resolve differences in reporting practices 
between countries. The role of local 
institutional characteristics needs to be 
taken into consideration when 
interpreting a company’s financial 
reporting practices.
Any changes in related 
regulations/standards 
that will be applicable 
to a variety of countries 
will be unlikely to 
resolve differences 
in reporting practices 
between countries. 
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VARIABLE DEFINITION DATASTREAM CODE OR OTHER SOURCE
CAP is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a company capitalises R&D during the year Net development costs: WC02504
RDExp is the research and development expense scaled by the market value of equity R&D expense: WC01201
Market Capitalisation: WC08001
RDCap is the capitalised amount of R&D measured as the change in net R&D assets plus 
amortisation of R&D scaled by the market value of equity
Net development costs: WC02504
Amortisation of R&D: WC01153
Market Capitalisation: WC08001
RD_expected is the amount expected to be capitalised Estimated (see section 3.2)
RD_unexpected is the difference between RDCap and RD_expected Estimated (see section 3.2)
BM is the book to market ratio Common equity: WC03501
Market Capitalisation: WC08001
RDValue is R&D value measured as the difference between the market value of equity and book 
value of equity less the amount of R&D capitalised during the year divided by the sum 
of current and lagged annual R&D expenditure
Common equity: WC03501
Market Capitalisation: WC08001
R&D expenditure: RDExp+RDCap
RDInt is the R&D intensity measured as R&D expenditure divided by total assets less the 
amount of R&D capitalised during the year
R&D expenditure: RDExp+RDCap
Total assets: WC02999
Size is the natural logarithm of market value of the company measured at the fiscal year end Market Capitalisation: WC08001
Beta is the firm beta estimated using 12 months of returns over each firm local index Datastream regression formula
Leverage is the total debt to book value of equity Total debt: WC03255
Common equity: WC03501
IntSalesPerc is international sales as a percentage of total sales IntSalesPerc: WC07101
PastBeat is equal to 1 if the prior year earnings are higher than current earnings assuming full 
expensing and the prior year earnings are lower than current earnings assuming full 
capitalisation and 0 otherwise (see also Dinh et al. 2005). Earnings refer to income 
before extra items/preferred dividends. 
Net income before extra items/preferred 
dividends: WC01551
ZeroBeat is equal to 1 if earnings assuming full expensing are negative and earnings assuming 
full capitalisation are positive and 0 otherwise (see also Dinh et al. 2005). ‘Earnings’ 
refer to income before extra items/preferred dividends.
Net income before extra items/preferred 
dividends: WC01551
BenchBeat
RDDISCLOSURE is total R&D-related disclosures: the sum of the number of times each firm makes 
reference to each of the terms in our keyword list. See Appendix II for the list of terms
Self-constructed
Age is the natural logarithm of a firm’s age Base date: BDATE
Corruption is a dummy variable equal to 1 if corruption in a given country and year is higher than 
the mean yearly value of corruption in our sample. We define corruption as the reverse 
of Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), so that the higher the score, the more corrupt a 
country is perceived to be
Transparency International
AudEnf is an index capturing the degree of accounting enforcement activity in each country, 
measured in 2008
Brown et al. (2014)
InvProtection is a measure of investor protection using the anti-director index La Porta et al. (2008
AntiselfDeal is the anti-self-dealing index La Porta et al. (2008)
CivCom is a dummy variable that takes the value of 0 if common law and 1 if civil law La Porta et al. (1998)
Baloftrade is the country-level balance of trade IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook 2016
DitriInfra is the country-level distribution infrastructure IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook 2016
EnerInfra is the country-level energy infrastructure IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook 2016
HeatlhInfra is the country-level health infrastructure IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook 2016
SkilledLabour is the country-level skilled labour IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook 2016
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Appendix I:
Definitions of variables used  
in all quantitative analyses
ability to sell development of new process patent registration research facilities
ability to use development of new products patent was awarded research facility
announced a collaboration development of proprietary 
technology
patents awarded research initiative
application pending development phase patents granted research operations
applications pending device development patents pending research phase
applied for patent drug candidate patents received research pipeline
applied research entering development pilot studies research programme
availability of financial resources established a collaboration pilot study research project
awarded patents evaluating the potential of planned investigation research unit
basic research existence of a market planned trial research venture
breakthrough in existing alliance platform development research, development
breakthrough innovation filed patent possible alliance research, engineering, and 
development
claims in this patent granted a patent preclinical data safety studies
clinical candidate important patent preclinical development safety study
clinical data in-process development process development service development
clinical development in-process research product candidate software development
clinical programme intellectual capital product development technical development
clinical studies intention to complete product engineering technical feasibility
clinical study internally generated projects in development technological breakthrough
clinical trial issued a patent prototype technology acquisition
collaborative initiative issued patents R&D technology breakthrough
collaborative research joint research received a patent technology development
completion of key milestones joint venture to develop received patents technology milestone
conduct research key patent research and development test data
continuing development of new knowledge research and evaluation project testing phase
develop technology new patent research and product development trial results
developing new process new project research centre
developing new products new technologies research collaboration
developing new technologies new technology research collaborative
developing new technology patent pending research development
* Keywords in red fonts are the keywords we added to the list used by Merkley (2014).
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Appendix II:
List of R&D key terms used  
in Phase 2 of the project
There has been a growing disparity between book values and market values, part of this can be 
attributed to accounting for development costs. But is accounting for R&D relevant to investors 
and what signals do expensed or capitalised costs send to the capital market? 
Under IAS 38 while research costs are expensed, development costs must be capitalised. Such capitalisation of development costs 
is, however, dependent on the costs meeting six conditions specified in the standard. Thus, the capitalisation of development costs 
is not a managerial choice. Nevertheless, from the financial statements’ preparers’ point of view, significant managerial judgement 
and detailed evaluations are required by preparers and auditors for their assurance so as to conclude whether these conditions have 
been met or not. In contrast, in the US all costs are expensed which provides no room for potential earnings management or 
benchmark-beating behaviour. 
Three main themes will be discussed within the interview.
1.  Why is R&D important; the relevance of R&D accounting compared with R&D spend; and does capitalisation send a signal 
to stakeholders? 
2.  The accounting treatment of R&D; prudence versus faithful representation and the recognition of R&D assets; preparer 
and auditor views on expensing and the assurance of capitalisation; comparison to US GAAP.
3.  Disclosure; views on minimal mandatory disclosure requirements; R&D voluntary disclosure usefulness; trade-off between 
disclosure and proprietary information.
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Appendix III:
Project overview and issues  
for the interviewees to consider
NON FULL CAPITALISERS (5,626) FULL CAPITALISERS (2,103) COMPARISON
Mean St. Dev. Min Median Max Mean St. Dev. Min Median Max T-test
Mann-
Whitney 
test
RDExp 0.051 0.075 0.000 0.022 0.393 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.051*** 0.022***
RDCap 0.023 0.040 0.000 0.007 0.188 0.023 0.040 0.000 0.007 0.188 0.000*** 0.000***
BM 0.721 0.682 0.049 0.517 4.302 0.889 0.840 0.049 0.622 4.302 –0.168*** –0.106***
RDValue 28.829 135.491 –706.516 5.651 3170.823 162.459 622.026 –706.516 13.667 3170.823 –133.630*** –8.016***
RDInt 0.063 0.080 0.000 0.033 0.471 0.022 0.056 0.000 0.005 0.471 0.041*** 0.029***
RDInt(sales) 0.158 0.721 0.000 0.044 8.289 0.128 0.832 0.000 0.006 8.289 0.030*** 0.039***
Size 14.363 3.260 6.073 14.296 26.159 13.120 3.085 5.628 12.715 24.806 1.242*** 1.581***
Beta 0.919 0.897 –1.710 0.895 3.770 0.833 0.965 –1.710 0.770 3.770 0.086*** 0.125***
Leverage 0.659 0.929 0.000 0.368 6.207 0.841 1.226 0.000 0.473 6.207 –0.182*** –0.105***
IntSalesPerc 48.478 34.969 0.000 50.195 100.000 40.340 33.914 0.000 37.150 100.000 8.138*** 13.045***
PastBeat 0.333 0.471 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.119 0.324 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.215*** 0.000***
ZeroBeat 0.153 0.360 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.080 0.271 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.073*** 0.000***
BenchBeat 0.403 0.490 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.171 0.376 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.232*** 0.000***
Age 15.355 10.983 1.000 13.000 52.000 14.102 9.093 1.000 12.000 51.000 1.254*** 1.000**
AudEnf 41.801 9.716 9.000 44.000 54.000 42.884 10.367 9.000 45.000 54.000 –1.084*** –1.000***
InvProtection 3.576 1.345 1.000 3.500 5.000 3.808 1.147 1.000 4.000 5.000 –0.232*** –0.500***
AntiselfDeal 0.595 0.258 0.172 0.469 1.000 0.580 0.248 0.172 0.469 1.000 0.015*** 0.000***
CivCom 0.696 0.460 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.636 0.481 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.061*** 0.000***
Corruption 0.999 0.027 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.636 0.481 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.364 0.000
Baloftrade –0.228 6.578 –31.277 1.865 25.400 –0.938 5.918 –31.277 –0.535 25.400 0.709*** 2.399***
DitriInfra 7.888 0.991 2.911 7.944 9.565 7.481 1.394 2.840 7.774 9.565 0.407*** 0.170***
EnerInfra 6.973 1.210 0.679 6.895 9.434 6.640 1.461 0.679 6.400 9.434 0.333*** 0.495***
HeatlhInfra 6.567 1.584 1.510 7.029 9.529 6.516 1.615 1.510 6.778 9.529 0.051 0.251**
SkilledLabour 5.790 0.781 1.877 5.780 8.275 5.704 0.929 1.877 5.781 7.925 0.085*** –0.001
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Appendix IV:
Descriptive statistics of full capitalisers  
and non full capitalisers
EXPENSERS CAPITALISERS
N Mean Median Min Max N Mean Median Min Max
PANEL A: FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (ONLY)
Basic Materials 315 6 5 1 25 53 8 5 1 57
Consumer Goods 418 6 5 1 94 162 9 7 1 32
Consumer Service 82 6 6 1 17 88 8 5 1 42
Financials 55 6 6 2 15 48 6 4.5 1 19
Health Care 297 19 15 1 112 182 14 9.5 1 92
Industrials 481 7 5 1 74 391 9 6 1 73
Technology 294 11 9 1 73 320 10 9 1 61
Telecommunication 99 10 6 1 45 26 14 9.5 2 47
Utilities 66 7 6.5 1 22 25 9 4 1 105
PANEL B: NARRATIVES (ONLY)
Basic Materials 298 14 8 1 120 56 12 6 1 67
Consumer Goods 379 11 6 1 99 146 19 12.5 1 95
Consumer Service 73 8 7 1 31 73 4 3 1 16
Financials 46 11 8 1 34 35 5 3 1 34
Health Care 294 32 22 1 230 176 22 18 1 150
Industrials 455 11 7 1 72 362 17 10 1 86
Technology 284 15 10 1 103 306 13 9 1 95
Telecommunication 90 12 7 1 85 20 11 6.5 1 39
Utilities 59 17 7 1 144 19 13 8 1 91
PANEL C: ANNUAL REPORT
Basic Materials 277 21 15 2 133 47 22 15 2 97
Consumer Goods 371 18 12 2 137 139 27 22 2 106
Consumer Service 71 15 13 2 48 62 11 9 2 32
Financials 42 16 13 4 47 28 10 7 3 50
Health Care 288 51 40 3 287 172 37 27 4 211
Industrials 437 18 13 2 81 351 26 19 2 151
Technology 278 26 20 2 131 294 23 18 2 120
Telecommunication 88 21 16 2 89 20 24 15 4 59
Utilities 56 25 15 2 153 18 25 13 2 144
Figures in bold highlight notable differences.
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Appendix V:
Detailed frequency analysis of R&D terms 
across industries, expensers and capitalisers
NAME** YEAR COUNTRY INDUSTRY Frequency of 
R&D terms in 
annual report
Frequency of 
R&D terms in 
narratives
Frequency of R&D 
terms in financial 
statements
R&D 
INTENSITY
TOP QUARTILE BASED ON TOTAL FREQUENCY OF R&D TERMS IN COMPANIES’ ANNUAL REPORTS
Capitalisers Evotex 2007 Germany Health care 109 91 18 0.419
BIOCON 2013 India Health care 151 74 77 0.042
NOKIA 2015 Finland Technology 111 95 16 0.112
Expensers AETERNA 
ZENTARIS
2014 Canada Health care 158 128 30 0.432
INFINEON 
TECHNOLOGIES
2014 Germany Technology 117 103 14 0.091
ADIDAS 2012 Germany Consumer 
Goods
100 93 7 0.012
2ND QUARTILE BASED ON TOTAL FREQUENCY OF R&D TERMS IN COMPANIES’ ANNUAL REPORTS
Capitalisers FIRST SENSOR 2015 Germany Industrials 30 20 10 0.054
AXIS 2015 Sweden Technology 31 16 15 0.346
TELIT COMMS 2013 United Kingdom Technology 28 15 13 0.275
Expensers BEIERSDORF 2015 Germany Consumer 32 26 6 0.027
IMAGINATION 
TECHNOLOGIES
2014 United Kingdom Technology 28 18 10 0.398
BATM ADVANCED 
COMMS.
2015 Israel Technology 29 12 17 0.058
3RD QUARTILE BASED ON TOTAL FREQUENCY OF R&D TERMS IN COMPANIES’ ANNUAL REPORTS
Capitalisers OXFORD METRICS 2015 United Kingdom Technology 18 10 8 0.111
ELICA 2015 Italy Consumer 
Goods
18 4 14 0.026
KRONES 2015 Germany Industrials 18 16 2 0.073
Expensers ESPIAL GROUP 2015 Canada Technology 18 10 8 0.127
CAPLIN POINT 
LABS.
2015 India Health care 17 9 8 0.026
COMPUTIME 
GROUP
2015 Hong Kong Industrials 18 9 9 0.004
4TH QUARTILE BASED ON TOTAL FREQUENCY OF R&D TERMS IN COMPANIES’ ANNUAL REPORTS
Capitalisers A2 MILK 2015 New Zealand Health Care 9 5 4 0.025
RICHEMONT 2015 Switzerland Consumer 
Goods
8 3 5 0.004
ZODIAC 
AEROSPACE
2009 France Industrials 8 7 1 0.008
Expensers SFS GROUP 2015 Switzerland Industrials 9 5 4 0.014
YOC 2015 Germany Consumer 
Services
9 7 2 0.103
HORNBY 2015 United Kingdom Consumer 
Goods
8 6 2 0.038
**Clicking on a company’s name will direct readers to the relevant annual report.
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Appendix VI:
Examples of companies with varying 
disclosure and R&D intensity levels


PI-INTANGIBLES-R&D 
ACCA The Adelphi 1/11 John Adam Street London WC2N 6AU United Kingdom / +44 (0)20 7059 5000 / www.accaglobal.com
